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Treasury and the IRS face a formidable task. Together, they are
charged with administering the morass that is the U.S. tax law.' In
fulfilling this duty, they face constant pressure regarding the amount
and nature of guidance that they should issue to taxpayers.2 When
making these decisions, tax administrators have to take into account a
variety of considerations, including the cost of issuing guidance, the
limited tax administrator resources available to do so, 3 and the likeli-
hood that taxpayers will exploit the guidance that is issued.
Against this backdrop of ongoing angst regarding release of tax gui-
dance, an important idea has surfaced in the tax compliance literature.
Prominent tax compliance scholars have argued that the strategic use
of tax law uncertainty may cause taxpayers to report higher tax liabil-
ity.4 Strategic tax law uncertainty,5 in this context, means strategically
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1 IRC § 7805 (tasking the Secretary of the Treasury with "prescrib[ing] all needful rules
and regulations"), § 7803 (allowing delegation to the Service).
2 Taxpayers and their advisors serve as a major source of pressure. See, e.g., ABA
Members Seek More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine (Jan. 18,
2011), 2011 TNT 12-13, Jan. 18, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File, for one of
many taxpayer demands for more guidance about the codified economic substance doc-
trine. The economic substance doctrine is discussed at text accompanying notes 98-112.
3 See letter from Douglas Shulman, IRS Comm'r, to Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate
Fin. Comm. (Nov. 5, 2010), reprinted in Shulman Warns of Challenges for IRS of Delayed
AMT Patch, 2010 TNT 217-23, Nov. 10, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (dis-
cussing the "strain" on the Service's "limited resources, which have been tapped on numer-
ous occasions over the last three years to implement tax legislation").
4 See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J.
Pub. Econ. 17, 17 (1989) ("When there is tax evasion, increased randomness about how
much taxable income an auditor would assess generally leads to higher reported income
and more revenue."); Suzanne Scotchmer, The Effect of Tax Advisors on Tax Compliance,
in 2 Taxpayer Compliance 182, 187 (Jeffrey A. Roth, John T. Scholz & Ann D. Witte eds.,
1989) ("[T]he imperfectly informed risk averse taxpayer bears involuntary risk, unlike the
489
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withholding tax law guidance, so that taxpayers have less certainty re-
garding their tax liability. 6 Scholars who provide support for strategic
uncertainty posit two responses to its use: (1) Risk-averse taxpayers
may dislike the involuntary risk imposed by more uncertain tax law
and therefore may report higher tax liability to minimize the risk. (2)
Taxpayers who believe that the IRS will audit more under increased
uncertainty may report higher tax liability to avoid the perceived
higher chance of audit.7 These theories suggest that tax administra-
tors could use uncertainty as another tool in the tax compliance arse-
nal.8 By strategically holding back on guidance for taxpayers with
underreporting opportunities, tax administrators could reduce taxpay-
ers' inclinations to take overly aggressive, or even evasive, reporting
positions.9 As a result, tax administrators could increase revenue by
reducing underreporting.
While these theories have strong economic appeal, this Article
counsels against their acceptance. In contrast to the support for stra-
perfectly informed taxpayer, who has the option of avoiding all risk. The risk averse tax-
payer may cope with involuntary risk by reporting conservatively."); Woon-Oh Jung, Tax
Reporting Game Under Uncertain Tax Laws and Asymmetric Information, 37 Econ. Let-
ters 323, 324 (1991) (setting forth game-theory model, which concludes that "in general an
increase in uncertainty induces conservative reporting (i.e., reporting of a higher amount),
and enhances the expected revenue of the agency"); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About
Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, 250 (2002) (citing Scotchmer and Slemrod model for
proposition that "uncertainty creates incentives for taxpayers to report higher amounts on
their tax returns," but also noting some potential objections, including that taxpayers may
be able to capture the majority of the bargaining surplus under uncertainty); Marsha Blu-
menthal & Charles Christian, Tax Preparers, in The Crisis in Tax Administration 201, 205
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) ("If taxpayers are averse to the risk of an
audit, they report more income as their uncertainty rises."); Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax
Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 241, 250-51 (2007)
("[I]f taxpayers are thought to be risk averse, it is not difficult to imagine how strategically
increasing tax law uncertainty, and hence the variance of possible tax outcomes, in some
contexts could serve the same function as increasing noncompliance penalties directly.").
Compare Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-
Based Penalties, 64 Tax L. Rev. 453 (2011) (analyzing how penalties can create risk for
risk-averse taxpayers given a stagnant amount of uncertainty).
5 For the remainder of the Article, the term "strategic uncertainty" is used to convey the
concept of strategically withholding tax law guidance.
6 A possibility not examined in the literature is that simply making taxpayers more cog-
nizant of the existing level of tax law uncertainty, without strategically withholding gui-
dance, may have the same impact. This method may be subject to less concern about
fairness. Fairness concerns are discussed further in Section II.D.
7 See Section II.C.
8 See Logue, note 4, at 250-51 for such a suggestion.
9 For a discussion of the difference between aggressive tax positions (also often charac-
terized as "tax avoidance") and evasion, see Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion:
A Retrospective View, 58 Nat'l Tax J. 643, 645 (2005) (describing "tax evasion" as "a viola-
tion of the law" and "tax avoidance" as "within the legal framework of the tax law"). In
this scheme, an aggressive position is one that is unlikely, but possible, under current law,
whereas tax evasion is clear failure to abide by existing tax law.
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tegic uncertainty in the literature, I argue that this move may have
perverse effects on taxpayer reporting and may lower, rather than
raise, revenue. This argument relies on fundamental features of the
tax compliance framework, which could create significant problems
with translating the theory behind strategic uncertainty into less un-
derreporting.' 0 As a result, this Article cautions against reliance on
strategic uncertainty as a tax compliance tool.
In so doing, this Article does not advocate tax law certainty at all
times at any cost." Rather, the Article seeks to undermine an in-
creasingly ingrained strain of thought, which provides support for stra-
tegic uncertainty as a revenue-raising tax compliance tool. More
generally, the Article cautions against the difficulties of relying upon
simplified economic models regarding taxpayer incentives when mak-
ing policy decisions for the complex real-world tax compliance
framework.12
10 This Article focuses on features of the tax compliance framework that exist across
different taxpaying contexts, such as business versus individuals. The Article also incorpo-
rates generalized empirical evidence regarding taxpayer reactions to uncertainty based on
actual tax return data, to the extent such empirical evidence is available. For a discussion
of the limitations that the IRS places on the release of its tax compliance data, see Steven
Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 2 (1989).
Future projects may expand on the analysis in this Article by examining at a more fine-
grained level the impact of uncertainty in different taxpaying contexts and by developing
additional empirical evidence regarding the impact of uncertainty on taxpayer behavior,
potentially through experiments, which would be sensitive to the fundamental features of
the tax compliance framework set forth in this Article.
11 Further discussion of some reasons why tax law uncertainty may, at times, be neces-
sary or desirable can be found in Section II.A.
12 In recent years, behavioral law and economics has questioned many of the neoclassi-
cal economic assumptions that have been integrated into law and economics. While vari-
ous behavioral modifications to economic principles can be re-envisioned as actually
following from classical economic assumptions, doing so is often a tortured and unconvinc-
ing process. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 18 (7th ed. 2007)
(explaining that "[h]yperbolic discounting may be explicable by positing that the 'individ-
ual' is actually a succession of separate selves, 'time sharing' the same body."). It is more
straightforward to accept that people often exhibit behavioral deviations from the rational
choice theory that underlies law and economics analysis. See Frank Cowell, Carrots and
Sticks in Enforcement, in The Crisis in Tax Administration, note 4, at 239 ("The expected
utility (EU) paradigm may be good as a device for simplified model building, but it may
miss important nuances about people's preferences in the face of uncertainty."). When
evaluating a policy in the abstract, conventional law and economics wisdom may helpfully
develop a theory of how completely rational utility-maximizing individuals should respond.
See Posner, supra, at 16 (emphasizing that economics produces theories, not descriptions).
If, however, behavioral study suggests that people will systematically respond to the policy
differently than economic theory predicts, optimal policymaking dictates incorporation of
this information into a decision regarding whether and how to adopt the policy. See Chris-
tine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 Stan L. Rev. 1471, 1544-45 (providing example where the government
should take into account consumers' failure to heed warnings in evaluating the costs and
benefits of installing a safety device); Edward J. McCaffrey & Jonathan Baron, Thinking
About Tax, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 106, 109 (2006) ("If people really do think in ways
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This Article sets forth three reasons to doubt the utility of strategic
uncertainty as a tax compliance tool designed to raise revenue by re-
ducing underreporting. First, strategic uncertainty may cause taxpay-
ers to perceive ambiguity, rather than risk, regarding particular tax
issues. Ambiguity is a particular form of uncertainty, in which taxpay-
ers face uncertainty regarding the probability of obtaining a tax out-
come. Taxpayers may have divergent reactions to increased
ambiguity, whereby taxpayers with a low chance of success on the
merits would be more likely to claim tax benefits, whereas taxpayers
with a high chance of success on the merits would have the opposite
inclination. As a result, the impact of strategic uncertainty on revenue
becomes unclear. Additionally, increased aggressiveness by taxpayers
with a low chance of success on the merits, offset by more conserva-
tive behavior by already conservative taxpayers, would be an undesir-
able reaction to a tax compliance tool designed to raise revenue by
reducing aggressive and evasive tax positions.
Second, the likelihood of monetary tax penalties applying actually
declines as uncertainty increases. Historical analysis indicates that the
decreasing likelihood of the imposition of penalties as uncertainty in-
creases is a deeply-rooted feature of the tax penalty system and is un-
likely to change. Tax penalties should cause taxpayers to avoid taking
a chance by reporting less than they owe, hoping to elude detection
and thereby reduce their total tax costs. As a result, the decline in
monetary tax penalties as uncertainty increases should significantly re-
duce taxpayers' incentives to report more tax liability in response to
strategic uncertainty and may cause taxpayers to report less. Addi-
tionally, while more empirical work remains to be done regarding
noneconomic incentives to pay taxes under uncertainty, the likely re-
duction of such noneconomic incentives in response to strategic uncer-
tainty may compound the effects of the increasingly low likelihood of
monetary tax penalties as uncertainty increases.
Third, taxpayers should not have strong tactical reasons to increase
tax liability reporting in response to strategic uncertainty and, instead,
may have the opposite incentives. While taxpayers may take into ac-
count the Service's incentives in deciding how much tax liability to
report, the IRS's ability to capitalize on broad-based strategic uncer-
tainty would require higher audit rates, a prospect that taxpayers
should be unlikely to find credible. Even if taxpayers believe that the
that deviate from ideal precepts of rationality, then social science or political theory that
aims to take into account how people think should consider the findings of contemporary
behavioral psychology and economics."). Additionally, while economic models are helpful
in determining how rational actors would act, given an assumed set of simplified parame-
ters, policy decisions must also take into how actors will respond when they face a deeply-
entrenched set of more complex parameters.
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IRS could audit more as uncertainty increased, taxpayers' incentives
to engage in negotiation posturing and an increasing tendency to rely
on professional tax return preparers might cause taxpayers to report
less, rather than more, tax liability in response to strategic uncertainty.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II sets forth
the emergence of the notion of strategic uncertainty as a tax compli-
ance tool. The next Part offers three reasons why this concept does
not withstand analysis: (1) Taxpayers' potentially divergent responses
to ambiguity may undermine the efficacy of strategic uncertainty. (2)
The decrease in tax penalties as uncertainty increases should impact
tax liability reporting incentives. (3) Tactical reasons may cause tax-
payers to report less, rather than more, tax liability in response to stra-
tegic uncertainty. Part IV concludes.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
A. Tax Law Uncertainty Generally
Understanding proposals for strategic uncertainty requires an un-
derstanding of tax law uncertainty generally. Tax law uncertainty, in
this context, means any type of tax law question that a taxpayer can-
not definitively resolve based on the available tax law authority. To
many, it may seem anathema not only to require the average, individ-
ual taxpayer to pay taxes to the government, but then also to subject
her to uncertainty regarding her tax liability. Indeed, the tax system
mirrors this impulse. The average taxpayer with a simple tax situa-
tion, such as receipt of only wage and interest income, does not expe-
rience significant legal uncertainty regarding tax liability.' 3 Tax
liability in such cases is generally not only clear, and likely to remain
clear even given a drastic increase in tax law uncertainty, but also sub-
ject to third-party information reporting, which alerts the IRS as to
the amount of tax owed.
13 This is not to say that taxpayers with relatively simple tax situations do not face signif-
icant actual or perceived compliance complexity and therefore substantial out-of-pocket
and anxiety costs in assessing and paying their tax liabilities. Joseph Bankman details how
the vast majority of taxpayers with only wage and interest income, and who do not itemize,
still perceive the income tax to be complex. Even for taxpayers who are subject to negligi-
ble tax law uncertainty, the experience of filing a tax return can be anxiety-provoking, as a
result of difficulty in determining which forms need to be filed and how to fill out the
information on each form. Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The Cali-
fornia ReadyReturn, 107 Tax Notes 1431, 1431 (June 13, 2005). For a more general defini-
tion of compliance complexity as "the problems faced by the taxpayer in keeping records,
choosing forms, making necessary calculations, and so on," see David F. Bradford, Untan-
gling the Income Tax 266-67 (1999); see also Gerald H. Goldberg, Comment, in The Crisis
in Tax Administration, note 4, at 140.
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As is well known to tax experts but perhaps much less well known
to nontax experts,14 taxpayers with more complicated tax profiles reg-
ularly have to deal with tax law uncertainty. For these taxpayers, un-
certainty abounds throughout the tax law, often increasing in
proportion to the complexity of the taxpayer's tax profile. The ques-
tion for these taxpayers is not whether uncertainty exists, but rather to
what degree.
There are a number of sources of tax law uncertainty. Prevalent use
of standards in the tax law may leave taxpayers unsure of the applica-
tion of a standard to a particular set of facts.'5 Tax rules often also
create uncertainty.16 Incredibly complex tax rules may have small but
gaping holes, leaving application of the rule uncertain.' 7
Tax administrators can, and do, play a significant role in either re-
ducing, or failing to reduce, the level of tax law uncertainty. Different
tax questions can have different degrees of uncertainty. As a result,
14 The tax law uncertainty literature in recent years has repeatedly recognized this point.
See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 Va. Tax
Rev. 339, 363 (2005) ("That there can be significant substantive legal uncertainty in the tax
laws may come as a surprise to nonexperts in the field."); Yehonatan Givati, Resolving
Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax Rulings, 29 Va. Tax Rev. 137,
138 (2009) ("Tax Law is ambiguous in many cases. Different interpretations of the law are
often possible, resulting in substantially different tax consequences.").
15 Examples of such standards include fundamental tax concepts such as the "ordinary
and necessary" standard applicable to deductions, IRC § 162(a), and the "business pur-
pose" standard applicable to corporate reorganizations, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
16 While legal uncertainty has been viewed as "a measure of the extent to which a legal
command is standard-like," Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 Encyclo-
pedia of Law & Economics: The Economics of Crime and Litigation 502, 513 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), both rules and standards may leave content
unspecified in advance. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analy-
sis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 584 (1992). For example, § 751 (d)(3) categorizes certain partnership
items as "inventory items" where they would be inventory items if held by a distributee
partner. Application of this rule is uncertain, however, as a result of conceptual difficulties
in application. (How is one to know, for example, whether property, now deemed to be
held by the distributee partner, is held by such partner in a business or nonbusiness
capacity?)
17 Section 382 of the Code provides a good example of this phenomenon. This section is
designed to place limits on the amount of net operating losses a company can use after an
ownership change. Despite its dizzyingly length and complexity, the government, until re-
cently, has failed to issue any meaningful guidance on how taxpayers should apply certain
statutory rules. For example, in determining whether an ownership change has occurred,
§ 382(l)(3)(C) dictates that "any change in proportionate ownership which is attributable
solely to fluctuations in the relative fair market values of different classes of stock shall not
be taken into account." Taxpayers historically have had little idea what this meant. For
one particularly complicated and still seemingly unworkable formulation of the meaning of
the statute, see Mark R. Hoffenberg, Owner Shifts and Fluctuations in Value: A Theory of
Relativity (Mar. 21, 2005), 2005 TNT 54-29, Mar. 22, 2005, available in LEXIS, Tax Ana-
lysts File. As a result of this complexity, the IRS recently released guidance that provides
taxpayers a range of possibilities, but still no definitive answers, regarding the meaning of
§ 382(l)(3)(C). Notice 2010-49, 2010-27 I.R.B. 1.
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tax administrators can often decrease the amount of uncertainty that
taxpayers face. As guidance regarding the likely outcome of a tax
question becomes clearer, uncertainty decreases. On the other hand,
tax administrators can increase uncertainty by providing less regula-
tory or administrative guidance or making such guidance less clear,
issuing fewer actions on decision,18 refusing to issue advance rulings
on tax questions, 19 limiting the disclosure of advance rulings provided
to taxpayers, or forgoing litigation of unclear tax issues.20 While
courts could try to fill some of the void by making clear pronounce-
ments when a tax case comes before them, their circumscribed role
would not allow them to fill the dearth caused by materially reduced
administrator guidance. 21 Tax administrators regularly utilize a wide
range of guidance, such as regulations, revenue rulings and proce-
dures, notices, and a variety of internal rulings and documents as well
as even less formal announcements. Such guidance is a huge part of
the tax landscape, and taxpayers and advisors take the issuance of
even informal guidance very seriously. 22
While Congress sometimes mandates that tax administrators issue
particular regulations, 23 for the most part tax administrators have sig-
18 Actions on decision are statements as to the Service's future litigation position re-
garding a court decision. IRS, Actions on Decision (AOD), http://www.irs.gov/app/pick-
list/list/actionsOnDecisions.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). Because of multiple fora in
which to litigate a tax question, a tax issue is far from decided even when a court rules on
the issue. As a result, the Service's release of an Action on Decision may be very impor-
tant to reduce uncertainty regarding an issue. A taxpayer may litigate a federal tax issue in
the United States Tax Court, the United States District Court, or the United States Court
of Federal Claims. David B. Porter, Where Can You Litigate Your Federal Tax Case, 98
Tax Notes 558, 558 (Jan. 27, 2003). While the Tax Court tries to apply the tax law consist-
ently throughout the country, the Golsen rule requires the Tax Court to follow a squarely-
on-point Court of Appeals decision where appeal lies to that court. Golsen v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970). Appeal lies to the United States Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which the taxpayer resides. Porter, supra, at 558. District courts are bound by
the Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the district court is located and the Supreme
Court. Id. at 559. Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims lies with the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.
19 The Service issues a "no-rule" list of issues for which it will not provide rulings. See
Rev. Proc. 2011-3, 2011-1 I.R.B. 111 (the domestic list for 2011); Rev. Proc. 2011-7, 2001-1
I.R.B. 233 (the international list for 2011).
20 See Sarah Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1017, 1072 (2009).
21 Moreover, as discussed further at note 125 and accompanying text, courts have shown
great reluctance to impose penalties when the tax law is uncertain. As a result, courts
contribute to the impetus to report less as tax law uncertainty increases.
22 Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land of Tax Code Interpretation,
2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 239, 239.
23 See, e.g., § 332(d)(4) ("The Secretary shall provide such regulations as appropriate to
prevent the abuse of this subsection ... ").
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nificant discretion regarding what guidance to issue. 24 In making deci-
sions whether to issue guidance and what type to issue, tax
administrators often face significant public pressure.25 In responding
to such pressure, administrators have to consider how the guidance
may be used and, potentially, abused by taxpayers. 26 In this context,
the issuance or failure to issue guidance becomes an important tax
administration tool, about which tax administrators have to make de-
cisions on a daily basis.27
Tax administrators may want to leave, or even increase, uncertain-
ties in the tax law for a number of reasons. Most simply, they may
leave uncertainties in the law due to the cost of elimination. Reducing
uncertainty to zero in all cases clearly is not feasible from a cost-bene-
fit perspective. Take § 162 as an example. It provides that taxpayers
may deduct all ordinary and necessary business expenses. While tax
administrators theoretically could list every conceivable expense in
every possible situation and indicate whether or not such expense
would be an ordinary and necessary business expense, doing so would
clearly have rapidly declining marginal returns.28
24 Even when Congress explicitly states that "[t]he Secretary shall prescribe regulations
that . . ." tax administrators often fail to issue the required regulations. For an interesting
discussion of this issue, see Phillip Gall, Phantom Tax Regulations: The Curse of Spurned
Delegations, 56 Tax Law. 413, 415 (2003).
25 The recent public furor over Treasury's refusal to issue guidance regarding codifica-
tion of the economic substance doctrine, discussed further at Subsection III.B.2, is a good
example of such pressure.
26 See Martin J. McMahon Jr., Living with the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine,
128 Tax Notes 731, 750 (Aug. 16, 2010) ("Certainty requires detailed rules. And detailed
rules breed more detailed rules, in a never-ending spiral, as taxpayers and their advisers
devise transactions designed to exploit anomalies in the rules resulting in tax benefits
vastly disproportionate to any economic benefit that might be realized from the
transaction.").
27 A recent meeting of the ABA Tax Section provides a representative example of how
essential even tax administrators' informal guidance is to the tax law landscape and how
frequently administrators must decide whether or not to issue guidance as part of adminis-
tration. At the meeting, Lee Kelley, IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate)
indicated the IRS position as to a number of complex corporate reorganization, spinoff,
and acquisition questions. In response to one of the questions, Kelley elaborated on the
IRS's thinking with respect to a recent private letter ruling issued by the Service. Eric
Solomon, Ernst & Young, noted that "there's a lot of law being made through the PLR
process" and that, even though taxpayers technically cannot rely on such guidance, "[wje
all know private letter rulings give taxpayers insight as to the IRS thinking on issues." At
the same meeting, William Alexander, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate) de-
murred regarding requests for guidance as to another set of corporate tax questions, indi-
cating that the question is "probably not a likely candidate for regulatory guidance in the
fairly near term." Amy S. Elliott, IRS Will Follow 50-Year-Old Revenue Ruling in Reorg
Letter Rulings, Official Says (Jan. 24, 2011), 2011 TNT 16-2, Jan. 25, 2011, available in
LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
28 On the other hand, eliminating uncertainty would not always be costly to tax adminis-
trators, at least in terms of the cost of creating guidance. Sometimes, for example, tax
administrators have existing, clearly defined internal guidance that would eliminate uncer-
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Tax administrators also may intentionally engage in "line-blurring,"
leaving uncertainties in the law or increasing uncertainty out of a be-
lief that doing so will dissuade taxpayers from engaging in undesirable
tax planning. Under this theory, risk-averse taxpayers may believe
that, as a result of uncertainty, they have to engage in even more ex-
tensive tax planning in order to get the desired tax result. If this plan-
ning gets too costly, the taxpayers may abandon the tax planning
transaction altogether. 29
tainty, at least as to the administrators' own interpretation of the law. There would be no
cost in promulgating the guidance, as it already exists, and yet tax administrators, for vari-
ous strategic reasons, may wish to keep the guidance secret. A history of ample litigation
shows tax administrators' refusal to reveal internal guidance on the application of the tax
law. See, e.g., Tax Analysts and Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Taxation
with Representation Fund v. IRS, 485 F. Supp. 263 (D.D.C. 1980); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117
F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The tax press has repeatedly voiced the opinion that the Service
intentionally keeps secret its application of the tax laws. Christopher E. Bergin, Trans-
parency Is a Two-Way Street, 126 Tax Notes 677 (Feb. 1, 2010) ("For almost 40 years Tax
Analysts has worked to force the IRS to disclose to taxpayers how it applies the tax laws to
them. The IRS has fought ferociously to keep its secret law just that: secret."). Recently,
tax lawyers have lamented the secret nature of advance pricing agreements, which are
issued in the context of transfer pricing disputes but which the Service does not publicly
release. See Richard C. Stark, Hartman E. Blanchard Jr. & Saul Mezei, Consistency, Sun-
shine, Privacy, Secret Law, and the APA Program, 130 Tax Notes 655, 656 (Feb. 7, 7011)
("The substance of these APAs could establish key categories of facts and data, agreed
approaches to interpreting them, and acceptable methodologies for assigning arm's-length
returns to functions such as manufacturing and distribution in these and other industries
.... There are statutory limitations on what information could be released, but the IRS
has stopped far short of those limitations by choosing as a practical matter to release virtu-
ally no substantive information concerning completed APAs.").
29 For a discussion of the use of uncertainty for this purpose, see Daniel Shaviro, Disclo-
sure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in Tax
and Corporate Governance 229, 241-42 (Wolfgang Schon ed., 2008). While a full discus-
sion of this potential use of uncertainty is outside the scope of this Article, it merits a bit of
elaboration. While many commentators accept line-blurring as a good reason for uncer-
tainty, it also suffers serious problems. First, taxpayers may prefer uncertainty, over a clear
rule that proscribes the tax planning scheme. To the extent that taxpayers exhibit uncer-
tainty-seeking, taxpayers may engage in more, rather than less, aggressive tax planning as
uncertainty increases. Whether taxpayers exhibit uncertainty-seeking would depend on
whether they believed that the desired tax result would have been disallowed under clear
law. If so, taxpayers may prefer uncertainty and be more willing to take aggressive posi-
tions as uncertainty increases. Additionally, uncertainty is not only costly to taxpayers
engaging in aggressive, undesirable tax planning schemes, it is also costly to those engaging
in business transactions that are not motivated by tax planning purposes. Take, as an ex-
ample, the wash sales rule, a friction put in place to prevent taxpayers from selling loss
property and immediately thereafter repurchasing the same property. The rule generally
disallows losses claimed to have been sustained from the sale of stock or securities if,
within thirty days of such sale, the taxpayer acquires identical stock or securities. IRC
§ 1091. Ideally, this rule should target and deter taxpayers who are selling stock only to
repurchase it, but not burden taxpayers engaging in real divestment of stock. The wash
sales rule is a reasonable friction from a design perspective if it sorts taxpayers actually
intending to engage in wash sales and those who are not. That is, the wash sales rule
works, at least from a sorting perspective, if a taxpayer who repurchases within thirty days
likely was engaged in a tax planning scheme, whereas a taxpayer who waited longer than
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that attributable to cost savings. Strategic uncertainty exists if tax ad-
ministrators leave or increase unnecessary uncertainties in the tax law
in order to raise revenue by reducing aggressive or evasive tax return
positions. This type of uncertainty does not mean skewing the law in a
direction disadvantageous to the taxpayer, for example, by only issu-
ing negative guidance. Rather, strategic uncertainty requires simply
holding back on guidance, which would include both positive and neg-
ative guidance. The theory is that the decreased certainty itself, rather
than any change in the direction of the law, may serve as a type of
compliance tool, which could cause taxpayers to report more of the
tax liability that they owe. It is this type of uncertainty that has gained
increasing support in the tax compliance literature, and therefore may
be gaining traction with tax administrators besieged with guidance de-
cisions. As a result, the remainder of this Article addresses only stra-
tegic uncertainty.
B. Economic Tax Compliance Models
Scholars root their support for strategic uncertainty in economic
models of taxpayers' decisions about how much tax liability to report.
The classic economic model is the Allingham-Sandmo ("A-S")
model.30 The A-S model applied Gary Becker's31 work regarding eco-
nomic analysis of crime and punishment to tax evasion, or the under-
statement of tax known to be owed. 32 The A-S model assumed that a
taxpayer has two choices: stating the actual tax owed, or understating
this amount, which will result in a penalty if the tax authorities detect
the understatement. 33 Relative to stating the actual amount of tax
owed, the taxpayer will be better off if he understates the tax and the
authorities do not detect the understatement, but worse off if he un-
derstates the tax and the authorities detect the understatement and a
thirty days before repurchase likely was not. If the wash sales rule becomes an uncertain
standard, rather than a clear rule, then the uncertainty burdens not only the former tax-
payer but also the latter. The taxpayer who sold stock, truly intending to divest of owner-
ship in the stock, may want to repurchase the stock six months later out of a belief that the
stock has now become really undervalued. An uncertain wash sales standard may dissuade
him from repurchasing, out of fear of having his prior loss disallowed. Line-blurring thus
only makes sense if the benefit in terms of reduced, undesirable tax planning outweighs the
uncertainty cost imposed on taxpayers who were not engaged in such planning.
30 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analy-
sis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323 (1972).
31 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.
169 (1968).
32 Allingham & Sandmo, note 30, at 323.
33 Id. at 324.
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penalty applies.3 4 Formally stated, a taxpayer will understate tax to
the extent that the benefit of the understatement exceeds the amount
of the understated tax plus the penalty for evasion and the applicable
interest, multiplied by the probability of detection.35
Economic work since the A-S model has expanded on and some-
times diverged from the model.3 6 One such development was an in-
teractive conception of taxpayer reporting, in which taxpayers engage
in tactical reporting techniques in order to avoid an audit. 3 7 In a vari-
ety of circumstances, these models have illustrated how taxpayers
often will respond by reporting tax liability tactically, if they believe
the IRS is auditing tactically. Taxpayers appear to exhibit some exam-
ples of this behavior, at least at very basic levels, such as by avoiding
tax reporting techniques believed to raise "red flags" that trigger
audits.38
C. How the Government Could Use Strategic Uncertainty to
Increase Revenue by Reducing Underreporting
Scholars supporting strategic uncertainty as a tax compliance tool
rely on two main arguments. First, some scholars rely on arguments
about risk aversion to posit that strategic uncertainty may cause risk-
averse taxpayerS39 to report more tax liability ("risk-averse" model). 40
This argument fundamentally relies on the A-S model of taxpayer re-
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 For a useful discussion of developments since the A-S model, see James Andreoni,
Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Literature 818 (1998).
37 For a classic example of such modeling, see Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum
& Louis L. Wilde, The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law En-
forcement, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 7 (1986).
38 For a discussion of this issue and a proposed fix, see Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum.
L. Rev. 569 (2006).
39 Determining whether taxpayers are risk averse may depend on the type of taxpayer.
A standard assumption is that individuals are often risk averse. Logue, note 14, at 370.
More debatable is whether firms are risk averse. Logue notes a number of reasons why
publicly traded corporations may be risk averse. For example, corporate managers (and
tax directors) may be risk averse as to certain tax consequences, even if loyal agents would
act in a risk-neutral manner. Id. at 371. Others suggest that corporations may not be quite
so risk averse as to an undesirable substantive tax law interpretation, at least after factor-
ing in the low audit rate. Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83
Tax Notes 1775, 1776 (June 21, 1999); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax
Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1317 n.10 (2001) (discussing same).
40 See, e.g., James Alm, Betty Jackson & Michael McKee, Institutional Uncertainty and
Taxpayer Compliance, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 1018, 1018 (1992); Blumenthal & Christian, note
5, at 205; Logue, note 16, at 374; Scotchmer & Slemrod, note 5, at 19-24; Scotchmer, note 4,
at 187. David Weisbach also suggests that increased uncertainty may increase revenue, but
in so doing he focuses on the asymmetry between a penalty that applies for underpayments
but not overpayments and does not (at least explicitly) focus on the role of risk with re-
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porting behavior, in which taxpayers weigh the potential gain from
underreporting against the potential cost from being audited and hav-
ing to pay a penalty plus interest. The risk-averse model expands on
the A-S model by examining the interaction between taxpayers' re-
porting decisions and uncertain tax law. When tax law is clear and
taxpayers are making a decision whether to under-report, they take a
risky gamble that pays off in the event that taxpayers are not au-
dited.41 In the A-S model, however, taxpayers know the total extent
of the risk, because they know the actual amount of tax they should
pay and therefore the total tax liability adjustment and penalty they
will be subject to, should they under-report and face audit. Tax law
uncertainty imposes additional, and involuntary, risk on the tax-
payer. 42 Taxpayers now face not only a risk regarding the possibility
of audit, but also a risk regarding the tax liability they face if audited.
The risk-averse model posits that this additional risk, and its covari-
ance with the risk of audit, may serve the same role as a noncompli-
ance penalty,43 thereby raising revenue by reducing aggressive and
evasive reporting.
Second, interactive models suggest that taxpayers may have an in-
centive to reduce under-reporting in response to strategic uncertainty,
as long as taxpayers believe that the IRS will audit more as a result of
the greater amount of uncertainty. The Service may wish to audit
more in response to strategic uncertainty if greater uncertainty creates
the possibility of a higher equilibrium benefit from auditing." Under
interactive models, taxpayers respond to IRS audit incentives.45 As a
result, if taxpayers believe that the Service holds these beliefs about
higher equilibrium benefit from auditing under greater uncertainty,
then they may believe the Service will audit more frequently in re-
sponse to strategic uncertainty. Taxpayers may respond by reporting
higher tax liability in order to avoid a higher perceived chance of audit
and resulting costs including tax liability adjustments, penalties, and
spect to strategic uncertainty designed to impact reporting positions. Weisbach, note 4, at
250. Part IV analyzes the role of penalty operation under uncertainty.
41 Alm et. al., note 40, at 1018.
42 Id.; Scotchmer & Slemrod, note 4, at 23.
43 Logue, note 4, at 250-51.
44 Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayers' Reporting Decisions and Auditing Under
Information Asymmetry, 64 Acct. Rev. 468, 479 (1989) (suggesting this may be the case).
Beck and Jung note, however, that if penalties become nontransferable, taxpayer reporting
will become more aggressive than in the case of transferable penalties. Id. at 479-81.
45 For examples of such modeling, see id.; Graetz et al., note 37.
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resource and opportunity costs that result from responding to an
audit.46
D. Fairness Objections to Strategic Uncertainty
An initial objection to strategic uncertainty may be that it seems
fundamentally unfair. In other words, simply as a matter of fairness,
tax administrators should not be able to create or leave unnecessary
uncertainties in the tax law. According to this perspective, whether or
not strategic uncertainty works as contemplated by the tax compliance
literature is beside the point.
Evaluating whether strategic uncertainty works, however, remains
crucial notwithstanding potential objections about whether it is fair.
First, while the principal aim of this Article is to examine whether
strategic uncertainty works rather than whether it is fair, at least some
notions of whether strategic uncertainty is fair may turn critically on
whether it works. Taxpayers engage in vastly different reporting prac-
tices, which largely correspond to their under-reporting opportunities.
Less than 1% of wage income is under-reported. 4 7 On the other hand,
taxpayers under-report an almost unbelievable 57% of nonfarm sole-
proprietor income and 72% of farm income.4 8 As a result, taxpayers
with only wage income bear a disproportionately large percentage of
tax liability, relative to taxpayers with business or farm income, as well
as relative to larger businesses, which also have significant under-re-
porting opportunities. Assuming that, in creating the tax law, Con-
gress believed it was fairly allocating the tax burden across taxpayers,
the misallocation itself may be a significant form of unfairness.
Since strategic uncertainty is not likely to affect taxpayers subject to
only wage and interest income, even given a drastic increase in tax law
uncertainty, 49 its primary effect would be on those taxpayers who have
the greatest under-reporting opportunities. If strategic uncertainty
did increase tax liability reporting among the taxpayers currently en-
gaged in significant under-reporting, then strategic uncertainty might
bolster rather than undermine fair tax allocation. Imagine a business
taxpayer taking deductions that she either knows or strongly suspects
that she is not entitled to take. Taking the deductions would reduce
her tax burden relative to a taxpayer with only wage income. If strate-
46 A number of interactive models suggest this result. Beck and Jung analyze the issue
in the context of discrete tax outcomes. Beck & Jung, note 44, at 473. Jung analyzes this
issue in the context of continuous tax outcomes. Jung, note 4, at 323.
47 Treasury Dep't, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Improving Voluntary
Compliance 13 fig.4 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/taxgap-report
final_080207_linked.pdf.
48 Id.
49 See text accompanying notes 13-14 for a discussion of this point.
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gic uncertainty caused the business taxpayer to report more of the tax
liability that she owes, the relative tax burden allocation between the
two taxpayers might be fairer. On the other hand, if strategic uncer-
tainty reduced tax reporting by the segment of taxpayers already sig-
nificantly under-reporting, such as this business taxpayer, then it could
worsen the unfair tax allocation that already exists. Determining
whether and how strategic uncertainty works, then, may be essential
to a discussion of fair tax administration.
Moreover, even if the use of strategic uncertainty was unfair or vio-
lated other normative principles, to the extent that tax administrators
nevertheless rely upon it under a mistaken belief that it works, de-
bunking this notion would be an important means of reversing policy.
As a result, even considering broader objections to the idea of strate-
gic uncertainty, it remains critical to determine whether this approach
would actually raise revenue by decreasing aggressive or evasive re-
porting positions of taxpayers with under-reporting opportunities.
III. DEBUNKING THE CASE FOR STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
In contrast to the support for strategic uncertainty in the tax compli-
ance literature, I offer three reasons why strategic uncertainty may not
raise revenue by reducing under-reporting.
A. Taxpayers May Exhibit Perversely Divergent Ambiguity-Seeking
and Aversion
Taxpayers may not fear increased risk as a result of reduced gui-
dance, in the manner contemplated by economic arguments in support
of strategic uncertainty. Rather, taxpayers may experience ambiguity
in response to strategic uncertainty. Taxpayers may have perversely
divergent reactions to ambiguity, which would both place in doubt the
impact of strategic uncertainty on revenue and undermine its efficacy
as a tool designed to reduce aggressive or evasive reporting.
The risk-averse model relies on a theory of how uncertainty may
cause risk-averse taxpayers to fear an increase in risk, as characterized
by an increase in variance.50 One simple example of how uncertainty
could increase variance is by increasing the dispersion of potential tax
liabilities, while holding the mean tax liability constant. Imagine that
a taxpayer faces a 50% chance of a tax liability being $100 or a 50%
chance of a tax liability being $500. If greater uncertainty caused the
taxpayer to face, instead, a 50% chance of the tax liability being zero
50 See, e.g., Logue, note 4, at 250-51 (discussing risk averse taxpayers' reactions to in-
creased variance under uncertainty); Scotchmer & Slemrod, note 4, at 25-27 (focusing on
risk).
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or a 50% chance of the tax liability being $600, then the variance of
potential tax liabilities has increased and the risk has increased. Es-
sential to this analysis is that risk exists when taxpayers face known
probabilities of particular outcomes. Risk may increase as the poten-
tial outcomes (or their percentage likelihoods) change, but in any
event the probability of the potential outcomes remains known.
Strategic uncertainty, however, often would have the effect of sim-
ply making taxpayers less sure of the probability of a given tax out-
come. Lack of certainty regarding the probability of a particular
outcome is a particular type of uncertainty, referred to as ambiguity.
For example, as famously characterized by Daniel Ellsberg, a person
faces ambiguity when betting on the color of a ball that will be drawn
from an urn, if she knows that the urn contains 100 balls, which are
either black or red, but she does not know the percentages of either.51
This situation is distinct from knowing that the urn contains fifty black
balls and fifty red balls. The latter case presents risk; the former
presents ambiguity.
In many cases, if tax administrators strategically withhold tax gui-
dance, taxpayers would experience increased ambiguity, not risk, re-
garding particular tax outcomes.52 An example of how strategic
uncertainty may increase ambiguity exists with the application of
§ 351 to transfers of property to a corporation. Absent special treat-
ment, the transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for stock
in the corporation is a realization event for the transferor subject to
income recognition.53 Section 351 provides a special exception to in-
come recognition in the case of property contributions, as long as cer-
tain requirements are met (namely that the transferors control the
corporation immediately after the exchange). 54 A fair amount of un-
certainty exists regarding the meaning of the "control immediately af-
ter the exchange" requirement.55 Many taxpayers likely experience
such uncertainty, and would experience increased uncertainty, as a
lack of confidence in the likelihood of being entitled to § 351 treat-
ment, or a state of ambiguity regarding entitlement to the tax benefit.
The reaction of taxpayers who perceive ambiguity in response to
strategic uncertainty is crucial in evaluating that uncertainty. While
51 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. Econ. 643, 650-61
(1961).
52 See Lawsky, note 20, at 1066-73, for comprehensive discussion of this point.
53 IRC § 1001.
54 IRC § 351(a).
5 See David R. Tillinghast & Denise G. Paully, The Effect of the Collateral Issuance of
Stock or Securities on the "Control" Requirement of Section 351, 37 Tax L. Rev. 251, 252
(1982) (noting that the immediately-after-the-exchange requirement has been extensively
litigated and discussed over the years).
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experimental evidence regarding taxpayer responses to ambiguity
about the entitlement to favorable tax positions is limited, some evi-
dence suggests that taxpayers exhibit divergent responses to such am-
biguity.56 Taxpayers who believe that they have a high percentage
likelihood of obtaining a favorable tax position (such as nonrecogni-
tion treatment under § 351) may be ambiguity-averse because they
like their chances of getting the favorable tax position. As a result,
they may be more likely to claim entitlement to the favorable tax posi-
tion when certainty exists regarding those chances but less likely to
claim entitlement to the favorable tax position when ambiguity exists
regarding the chances. On the other hand, taxpayers who believe they
have a low percentage likelihood of obtaining a favorable tax position
may be ambiguity-seeking. These taxpayers, who view their chances
of success as low under certain tax law, may welcome the chance to
take a gamble when the likelihood of disallowance of the favorable
tax position becomes less certain. As a result, these taxpayers may be
more likely to claim a favorable tax position in response to strategic
uncertainty.
In one notable experiment regarding taxpayers' likelihood of claim-
ing a tax deduction, taxpayers exhibited both ambiguity-seeking and
ambiguity aversion regarding the probability of detection and penal-
ties.57 Specifically, in the experiment, subjects had to decide whether
to take a tax deduction. Subjects received information that, while
most accountants believed the deduction was perfectly legal, the Ser-
vice spot-checks returns for the deduction and if the Service screened
a return and found the deduction, the Service would disallow it and
the taxpayer potentially would have to pay a penalty on the disal-
lowed deduction. Subjects received a prompt from a tax accountant
indicating the probability estimate that the Service would spot-check
their return and a probability estimate of the penalty that the Service
would impose if it disallowed the deduction. Additionally, the sub-
jects received disclaimers by the tax accountant regarding the level of
confidence in the probability of detection and penalty estimates.58
Disclaimers either indicated uncertainty regarding the probability esti-
mates through statements that the accountant was "very unsure and
56 See, e.g., Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk Information
on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 360, 369-75
(1991); see also Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambigu-
ity, 59 J. Bus. S225, S243-47 (1986) (finding evidence of how the likelihood and desirability
of facing a particular outcome affect attitudes toward ambiguity).
57 Casey & Scholz, note 56, at 369-75.
58 Id. at 371.
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hesitate[d] to guess" or indicated certainty regarding the estimates by
describing them as "exact."59
The experiment revealed ambiguity-seeking when the taxpayer
faced unfavorable estimates regarding the probability of detection and
penalties and ambiguity aversion when the taxpayer faced favorable
estimates regarding the probability of detection and penalties. 60
When the estimated probability of detection was high, subjects were
more likely to take the deduction if the estimate was vague.61 When
the estimated probability of detection was low, subjects were more
likely to take the deduction if the estimate was precise.62 The experi-
ment found the same results for the penalty estimates. 63 When the
penalty estimate was high, subjects were more likely to take the de-
duction if the estimate was vague.64 When the penalty estimate was
low, subjects were more likely to take the deduction if the estimate
was precise.65
More data is needed to determine how and when taxpayers exhibit
these divergent tendencies. Nonetheless, some anecdotal evidence
from the partnership anti-abuse regulation also suggests that taxpay-
ers exhibit a mixture of tax law ambiguity aversion and seeking.
Moreover, in this context, taxpayers' divergent tendencies seemed to
correspond to a high or low perceived chance of success on the merits,
respectively.
The partnership anti-abuse regulation, released in 1994, provides
that the Commissioner can recast a partnership transaction for federal
tax purposes "if a partnership is formed or availed of with a principal
purpose to reduce substantially the present value of the partners' ag-
gregate federal tax liability in a manner inconsistent with the intent of
subchapter K." 6 6 The regulation, even as finalized, is repeatedly and
self-consciously equivocal. For example, under the regulation, the fac-
tors set forth to determine "[w]hether a partnership was formed or
availed of with a principal purpose to reduce substantially the present
value of the partners' aggregate federal tax liability in a manner incon-
sistent with the intent of subchapter K . . . may be indicative, but do
not necessarily establish, that a partnership was used in such a man-
ner. "67 The regulation warns further that "[t]hese factors are illustra-
59 Id.
60 Id. at 373.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 374.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 371-75.
66 Reg. § 1.701-2(b). Subchapter K sets forth the partnership taxation rules.
67 Reg. § 1.701-2(c).
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tive only, and therefore may not be the only factors taken into account
in making the determination." 6 8 Additionally, "[t]he presence or ab-
sence of any factor described .. . does not create a presumption that a
partnership was (or was not) used in such a manner." 69 This regula-
tion seemed almost designed to undermine any sense of certainty, in-
cluding the probability of running afoul of the regulation. Taxpayers'
reactions, therefore, can seemingly be reasonably characterized, at
least in part, as a reaction to ambiguity.
The tax bar responded to the introduction of the regulation by de-
crying the ambiguity it engendered.70 For example, the Office of
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion complained,
[I]t is one thing to expect tax practitioners to judge the tax
ramifications of business transactions based on an [sic] rea-
sonable ascertainable standard elucidated by the Service. It
is quite another to require these practitioners to render an
opinion based on a standard which the Service has not yet
adequately articulated in its regulations.7 '
Notably, practitioners seemed particularly concerned about the im-
pact of the anti-abuse regulation on positions that the tax law histori-
cally clearly protected. For example, critics of the regulation
questioned whether the regulation would impact seemingly well-es-
tablished tax treatments such as special allocations of depreciation. 72
While perhaps such questions were merely rhetoric designed to attack
the regulation as an extreme overreach by the government, which
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Tax Notes Today in 1994 had a significant number of letters and articles making this
objection or a variation of it. See, e.g., Letter from Sheldon I. Banoff, Katten Muchin &
Zavis, to IRS (May 19, 1994), reprinted in Partnership Antiabuse Regs Should be Re-
scinded, Banoff Asserts, 94 TNT 106-24, June 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File; Letter from Michael S. Wolff, Nat'l Dir. of Tax Serv., Grant Thornton, to IRS (July 21,
1994), reprinted in Grant Thornton Calls Antiabuse Rule an Invitation to Unfairness, 94
TNT 141-34, June 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; Letter from Coopers &
Lybrand to IRS (July 5, 1994), reprinted in Coopers & Lybrand Urges Withdrawal of Part-
nership Antiabuse Rule, 94 TNT 172-25, Sept. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File.
71 Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to
IRS (Aug. 26, 1994), reprinted in SBA Criticizes Partnership Antiabuse Rule, 94 TNT 228-
27, Nov. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
72 Letter from Joseph Bankman, Stanford Law Sch., to Internal Revenue Service (July 1,
1994), reprinted in Stanford Professor Rebuts Criticism of Partnership Antiabuse Reg., 94
TNT 140-33, July 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (disagreeing with a critic
who argues that the regulations will cast doubt on special allocations of depreciation).
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would place into doubt the most sanctified tax law transactions,7 3
these strongly-voiced concerns regarding run-of-the-mill transactions
were in striking contrast to the more muted criticisms against the reg-
ulation by well-known aggressive partnership tax lawyers. 74 To the
extent that the tax bar's seemingly unfounded concern about protect-
ing longstanding tax benefits was sincere, it may be an example of
ambiguity aversion when the probability of desired tax treatment dis-
allowance is low. At the same time, this aversion seemed to have
been matched by ambiguity-seeking by taxpayers with a perceived low
chance of success on the merits.
This example illustrates how strategic uncertainty may often cause
taxpayers to experience increased ambiguity. Moreover, taxpayer re-
actions to ambiguity are likely to be mixed, and, as a result, the impact
of strategic uncertainty on revenue becomes unclear. Additionally, if
strategic uncertainty indeed causes taxpayers with a low perceived
chance of success on the merits to become more aggressive in claiming
entitlement to tax benefits, while having the opposite effect on taxpay-
ers with a perceived high chance of success on the merits, then the
impact on tax compliance would be perverse; these divergent re-
sponses would undermine strategic uncertainty's efficacy as a tool de-
signed to raise revenue by reducing aggressive or evasive reporting.
B. Penalties Decrease as Uncertainty Increases
A second reason why strategic uncertainty may not raise revenue in
the manner contemplated by the tax compliance literature is because
the prospect of tax penalties declines as tax law uncertainty increases.
Under the current tax penalty structure, as uncertainty increases, tax
penalties are less likely to apply. Moreover, as an historical approach
reveals, the inverse relationship between uncertainty and penalty like-
lihood is deeply rooted in fundamental notions of the nature of tax
penalties and appears unlikely to change.75 This relationship is an im-
portant reason to doubt the utility of strategic uncertainty as a tax
compliance tool. As a result of the decreasing operation of tax penal-
ties as tax law uncertainty increases, taxpayers should have less impe-
73 Bankman suggests this may have been the case. Id.
74 Lee A. Sheppard, Final Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Not So Bad, Apparently (Jan.
20, 1995), 95 TNT 13-8, Jan. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (discussing
some of the muted criticism by a well-known aggressive partnership tax lawyer).
75 The recent enactment of a strict liability penalty for transactions that lack economic
substance has the potential to be a significant deviation from penalty operation under un-
certainty. For the reasons discussed further in Subsection III.B.2, however, it seems likely
that, in the long run, the penalty will be confined to the tax shelter context, which would be
consistent with the general operation of penalties under uncertainty. See notes 104-12 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this issue.
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tus to report more tax liability and, instead, may have strong reasons
to report less tax liability in response to strategic uncertainty. Moreo-
ver, noneconomic incentives to report tax liability may magnify this
result. Potential nontax penalties, such as financial reporting con-
cerns, do not appear to change the penalty calculus.
1. Monetary Penalties
Economic models depend on monetary penalties as the principal
reason why taxpayers report tax liability rather than taking a chance
and under-reporting, hoping not to be audited.76 As a result, if mone-
tary penalties decrease in response to strategic uncertainty, then an
important impetus to report tax liability should decrease as well. As
detailed below, unlike in a straightforward A-S model, in which the
taxpayer is assumed to be under-reporting, or "evading," tax known
to be owed,77 as tax law uncertainty increases, the taxpayer's tax obli-
gation becomes less clear. As this tax obligation becomes less clear, a
monetary tax penalty becomes less likely to apply under the current
tax penalty structure. As a result, taxpayers should have a decreasing
impetus to report more tax liability as uncertainty increases, and may
have the opposite incentive.78
Accuracy penalties are the primary monetary penalties that apply in
cases of tax law uncertainty. 79 If an accuracy penalty applies, a pen-
76 See Scotchmer, note 4, at 184 ("Most of the tax compliance literature written by econ-
omists presumes that taxpayers have no commitment to honesty and report income only to
the extent that reporting is in their utility-maximizing interest. The primary means of per-
suasion is threat of penalty.").
77 See, e.g., Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View, 58 Nat'l
Tax J. 643, 645 (2005) (discussing both how the A-S model applies in the context of evasion
and how, in contrast, "it is hard to imagine that a penalty will be imposed on the basis of
transactions that are truthfully reported").
78 Increased uncertainty and decreased likelihood of penalties have opposite effects. At
least under an economic model, the former would increase variance, while the latter would
decrease variance. The net impact would depend on the relationship between the increase
in uncertainty and the decrease in penalties. While difficult to show that penalties decrease
faster than uncertainty increases, the important point is that we simply do not know
whether strategic uncertainty would increase variance, after taking into account the decline
in penalty likelihood. Moreover, the decreased operation of tax penalties under uncer-
tainty should undermine taxpayers' incentives to report higher tax liability, relative to ro-
bust operation of tax penalties under uncertainty. As a result, we have reason to doubt
whether strategic uncertainty would actually cause taxpayers to report higher tax liability,
and we have some reason to believe that taxpayers may have the opposite reporting incen-
tives. I thank David Weisbach and Sarah Lawsky for exploring this point with me.
79 A fraud penalty equal to 75% of the underpayment attributable to fraud also poten-
tially applies to erroneous reports of tax liability. IRC § 6663(a). Fraud is "actual, inten-
tional wrongdoing, and the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed
to be owing." Estate of Temple v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 143, 159 (1976) (quoting Mitchell
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941)). This level of scienter will not exist if
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alty of 20% of the portion of the underpayment attributable to the
accuracy penalty is imposed.80 The first accuracy penalty is negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations. Negligence means "any failure to
make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title,"
and "the term 'disregard' includes any careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard." 8 Even if a taxpayer takes a position contrary to a revenue
ruling or IRS notice, the taxpayer "has not disregarded the ruling or
notice if the contrary possibility has a realistic position of being sus-
tained on its merits." 82 In this case, even though the government has
issued a direct position on a tax issue, if contrary authority creates
uncertainty about the viability of the government's position, no pen-
alty applies. Where no controlling authority dictates the result, a tax-
payer is unlikely to have failed to make a "reasonable attempt to
comply with" the Code or "careless[ly], reckless[ly], or intentional[ly]
disregarded" it.83
While the Code imposes a number of accuracy penalties designed to
operate in a more strict liability fashion, these penalties generally ap-
ply only in limited contexts and have high understatement thresholds
(which impliedly indicate fault).84 They also have occasional, addi-
tional pervasive fault-based carveouts.85 The substantial understate-
ment penalty applies more broadly for any understatement that
exceeds a given threshold, but this penalty, too, has significant fault-
based carveouts.8 6 As uncertainty increases, a taxpayer has an in-
the taxpayer takes an aggressive but possible tax position when the law is unclear. See
Givati, note 14, at 165 (concluding the same).
80 IRC § 6662(a). This penalty is increased to 40% in the case of a gross valuation mis-
statement. IRC § 6662(h).
81 IRC § 6662(c).
82 Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2).
83 IRC § 6662(c).
84 There are penalties for substantial valuation misstatements, substantial overstatement
of pension liabilities, and substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatements. IRC
§ 6662(b). These penalties are limited, respectively, to situations in which: (1) the value or
adjusted basis of property claimed on a tax return is 150% or more of the correct valuation
or adjusted basis or a § 482 valuation misstatement exists that exceeds certain specified
thresholds, (2) actuarial determination of pension liabilities is 200% or more of the correct
amount of such liabilities, or (3) the value of any estate or gift tax property is 65% or less
than the correct valuation. IRC § 6662(e), (f), (h).
85 The § 482 penalty, for example, is subject to a number of exclusions if the taxpayer
used a "reasonable" method for determining a transfer price. IRC § 6662(e)(3)(B).
86 This penalty applies to an understatement of income tax for a taxable year that "ex-
ceeds the greater of (i) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the
taxable year, or (ii) $5,000." IRC § 6662(d)(1)(A). In the case of corporations, a substan-
tial understatement of income tax exists if the understatement for a taxable year "exceeds
the lesser of (i) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable
year (or, if greater, $10,000), or (ii) $10,000,000." IRC § 6662(d)(1)(B). The seemingly
strict liability operation of the penalty above the threshold is substantially undermined by
built-in reductions of the penalty in various circumstances. Understatements are reduced
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creasingly low bar to meet in order to apply one of the fault-based
carveouts. The regulations specifically contemplate this result, indi-
cating that "[t]here may be substantial authority for the tax treatment
of an item despite the absence of certain types of authority. Thus, a
taxpayer may have substantial authority for a position that is sup-
ported only by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statu-
tory provision."87
The penalty defenses make application of a penalty even less likely
in a case of tax law uncertainty. Most notably, an omnibus defense
applies in the case of all the accuracy-related penalties.88 Under this
defense, "[n]o penalty may be imposed under section 6662 with re-
spect to any portion of an underpayment upon a showing by the tax-
payer that there was reasonable cause for, and the taxpayer acted in
good faith with respect to" the underpayment. 89 "[A]n honest misun-
derstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts
and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and educa-
to the extent that the taxpayer has or had substantial authority for the understatement, or
if the taxpayer disclosed the questionable item and a reasonable basis existed for the tax-
payer's treatment. IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B). Substantial authority exists when "the weight of
authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary treatment." Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i). A reasonable basis exists if the
position is based on one or more of the congressional, judicial, or administrative authori-
ties set forth in the regulations. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (referring to authorities in Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) as generally satisfying the reasonable basis standard). These authori-
ties include: the Code, regulations, revenue rulings and procedures, tax treaties and regu-
lations, Treasury Department explanations, court cases, congressional intent as indicated in
a variety of reports and congressional sources, Joint Committee explanations, private letter
rulings and technical advice memorandum, and Service information releases and other ad-
ministrative pronouncements. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). Both the substantial authority
and reasonable basis standards are very low. A reasonable basis exists if the taxpayer's
position has a one-in-five chance of success and substantial authority exists if the tax-
payer's position has a two-in-five chance of success. Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n,
106th Cong., Study of Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section
3801 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, vol. I, at 152 tbl.7 (Comm. Print
1999), available at http://www.jct.gov/s-3-99.pdf [hereinafter Joint Committee Penalty Re-
port]. Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 111, 116-17
(2009). The Joint Committee report describes these values as "a general consensus of
scholars and practitioners based on a survey of the literature." Joint Committee Penalty
Report, supra, at 152.
87 Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii).
88 Some limited exceptions apply. This defense may not apply in certain cases to sub-
stantial or gross valuation overstatements with respect to charitable deduction property.
IRC § 6664(c)(2). The reasonable cause exception will apply, however, in these cases if
"(A) the claimed value of the property was based on a qualified appraisal made by a quali-
fied appraiser, and (B) in addition to obtaining such appraisal, the taxpayer made a good
faith investigation of the value of the contributed property." IRC § 6664(c)(2)(A), (B).
89 Reg. § 1.6664-4(a). This is a facts and circumstances determination and "[g]enerally
the most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's
proper tax liability." Reg. § 1.6664-4(b).
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tion of the taxpayer" may indicate reasonable cause and good faith.90
Since uncertainty allows a taxpayer to claim an honest misunderstand-
ing of the law, the omnibus defense often will eliminate penalties that
would otherwise apply. 91
2. Tax Shelter Penalties
One caveat to the above discussion applies. For limited transac-
tions, the likelihood of monetary tax penalties does not decrease to
the same extent when tax law uncertainty increases. These are highly
engineered transactions designed to produce tax advantages not in-
tended by the law, often referred to as "tax shelters." The existence of
these tax shelter penalties, however, should not change taxpayers'
general reporting incentives outside of the tax shelter context.92 Ad-
ditionally, even for tax shelter transactions, taxpayers are particularly
unlikely to respond to strategic uncertainty by reporting more tax lia-
bility, because the very creation of these transactions is dependent on
the hope of winning the audit lottery and never being examined.
The penalty provisions are harsher and less forgiving when the tax-
payer appears to have strategically engineered into an abusive tax re-
duction transaction, as with a tax shelter. The substantial
understatement penalty cannot be reduced as a result of disclosure
and reasonable basis or substantial authority if the understatement is
attributable to a tax shelter.93 Section 6662A applies an accuracy pen-
alty of 20% (or 30% in the case of failure to meet disclosure rules) to
reportable transaction understatements. 94 While the reasonable cause
exception generally applies to this penalty, it does not apply unless the
taxpayer adequately discloses the transaction, substantial authority
exists, and the taxpayer reasonably believes that its treatment was
proper. 95 Additionally, a corporation can take into account its legal
justification under the reasonable cause defense for tax shelter items
9 Id.
91 Additionally, the negligence penalty will not apply if a return position has a reasona-
ble basis. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1). A disregard penalty will not apply if the return position
had a reasonable basis and the taxpayer adequately disclosed the position on the return.
Reg. § 1.6662-3(a).
92 This "dual nature" of monetary tax penalties, whereby penalties apply when the law is
clear and to tax shelters regardless of the level of uncertainty, merits future examination.
93 IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B), (C).
94 These are understatements attributable to transactions that taxpayers must disclose
on their tax returns because they are potential tax shelter transactions. IRC § 6707A. This
penalty generally applies in lieu of the IRC § 6662(a) penalties. See IRC
§ 6662A(e)(1)(B).
95 IRC § 6664(d).
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only if substantial authority exists and the corporation reasonably be-
lieved that the treatment was more likely than not proper.96
Recently, as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, Congress strengthened the harsher application of penal-
ties to tax shelter transactions even under uncertainty. 97 The Act
codified the economic substance doctrine, which previously had been
an important judicial tool to disallow the tax benefits from tax shelter
transactions.98 Specifically, § 7701(o) of the Code now provides that,
when the economic substance doctrine is relevant, a transaction will
have economic substance only if the transaction meaningfully changes
the taxpayer's economic position and the taxpayer has a substantial
business purpose for entering into the transaction.99
Additionally, the Act added a new accuracy penalty for transactions
lacking economic substance. The penalty is 20% of the underpayment
of tax, or 40% if the transaction is not disclosed. 00 Finally, the Act
eliminated the reasonable cause exception for non-economic sub-
stance transactions, including reportable transaction understatements
attributable to one or more non-economic substance transactions.101
Even though the economic substance doctrine has always been used
as a judicial tool to attack tax shelters, tax advisors have worried that
this codification may extend strict liability penalties beyond the tax
shelter context. In the wake of economic substance codification, in a
manner reminiscent of the enactment of the partnership anti-abuse
rule, taxpayers have voiced strong concern that economic substance
codification and the associated strict liability penalty could apply not
only to tax shelters, but also routine tax transactions. In support of
this concern, taxpayers have cited not only the indeterminacy of the
economic substance doctrine itself,102 but also the fact that the eco-
96 Reg. § 1.6664-4(f).
97 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409,
124 Stat. 1031, 1067-71.
98 For a recent discussion of the economic substance doctrine and related issues, see
Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 389 (2010).
99 Taxpayers may not use federal tax reduction to prove either the objective or subjec-
tive prong of the economic substance doctrine.
100 IRC § 6662(i).
101 IRC § 6664(c)(2).
102 Taxpayers and their advisors have urged that codification could place in jeopardy
sacrosanct tax planning. As examples, tax advisors have argued that the doctrine could
disallow the sale of loss property, such as a pool of mortgages, for a different pool of
mortgages if the purpose of the sale was to recognize a tax loss. Letter from Mark
Silverman & Amanda Pedvin Varma, Steptoe & Johnson, to Michael F. Mundaca, Ass't
Sec'y (Tax Pol'y), Treas. Dep't (July 7, 2010), reprinted in Firm Seeks Guidance on Eco-
nomic Substance Doctrine, 2010 TNT 130-11, July 8, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Ana-
lysts File. Tax advisors cite this example because the Supreme Court famously held in an
important tax case that taxpayers could recognize a loss under these exact facts. Cottage
Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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nomic substance penalty applies to "[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax
benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance . . . or
failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law."103
Taxpayers' concerns, while understandable, seem an over-reaction
that will subside over time. Economic substance codification likely
will not expand the reach of the doctrine, or robust penalty applica-
tion under uncertain tax law, outside the tax shelter context. As an
initial matter, Congress made sure to indicate that codification does
not change the decision about when to apply the economic substance
doctrine. The statute merely provides a definition for the economic
substance doctrine "[i]n the case of any transaction to which the eco-
nomic substance doctrine is relevant." 104 As a result, codification
should not be an impetus for the doctrine, or the new accompanying
strict liability penalty, being applied outside the tax shelter context in
which the economic substance doctrine historically has been used.
The reaction of government officials to taxpayers' concerns bolsters
the conclusion that codification should not expand application of the
economic substance doctrine (or the accompanying strict liability pen-
alty) outside of the tax shelter context. As was the case with the part-
nership anti-abuse rule, government officials have rushed to defend
the codified economic substance doctrine by indicating that it was
meant to apply and will be applied only to abusive transactions, not
ordinary tax planning. Treasury has suggested that the penalty should
potentially only apply in "appropriate cases." 05 Treasury Deputy Tax
Legislation Counsel Bryon Christensen indicated that Service officials
are "sensitive to the fact that what they do out of the gate affects both
the value of the economic substance doctrine as an antiabuse rule go-
ing forward" and whether the Service actually will be able to assert
103 IRC § 6662(b)(6).
104 IRC § 7701(o).
105 Jeremiah Coder, Government Hopes to Alleviate Some Uncertainty on Economic
Substance, Treasury Official Says (May 12, 2010), 2010 TNT 92-1, May 13, 2010, available
in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. In so doing, Treasury was acknowledging the suggestion of
Monte A. Jackel, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, that the penalty should only apply in "ap-
propriate cases." Id. Among other preconditions to penalty application, Jackel had sug-
gested that the penalty should only apply after the Service considered (1) "the taxpayer's
effort to assess its proper tax liability under the statutory economic substance doctrine in a
manner similar to reg. section 1.6664-4(b)(1)," (2) the taxpayer's statement of facts and law
and any legal opinion as occurs under reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1), (f) (except that a "more likely
than not" opinion should not be required), (3) "the novelty of the issue," and (4) "the
published precedent under the economic substance doctrine as applied to the facts of the
taxpayer's case." Monte A. Jackel, Dawn of a New Era: Congress Codifies Economic
Substance, 127 Tax Notes 289, 295 (Apr. 19, 2010). Jackel's preconditions to penalty appli-
cation would obliterate any suggestion that the penalty had actually eliminated, or even
seemingly chipped away at, the reasonable cause exception for non-economic substance
transactions.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
513
514 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:
the penalty in a strict liability fashion.10 6 As a result, Treasury officials
have indicated that they will establish "clear procedures" to make
sure that revenue agents apply the economic substance penalty only
within the limited context intended.107 Government officials have
pointedly affirmed that, other than applying a strict liability penalty,
"nothing has really changed,108 that "the new law is not transforma-
tive," 109 and that "codification should have a minimal practical im-
pact."110 The Large Business and International Division (LB&I) has
recently gone a long way toward making good on these assurances,
with a new directive that clearly limits application of the economic
substance penalty. The directive requires examiners to walk through
four steps prior to determining that an economic substance penalty is
appropriate. The steps make clear that the penalty is appropriate in
extraordinary, tax shelter type of contexts, not with ordinary tax plan-
ning. Additionally, the directive explicitly states that, until further
guidance is issued, the penalty will apply only to the economic sub-
stance doctrine, not any other "similar rule of law."111 While only
time will tell for certain, it seems very likely that actual application of
the codified doctrine will indicate the clear limitation of the doctrine
to the tax shelter context.112
106 Jeremiah Coder, Treasury Official Reiterates Limited Scope of Economic Substance
(June 21, 2010), 2010 TNT 118-2, June 21, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
107 Crystal Tandon, Treasury Planning Guidance on Economic Substance Penalties (May
27, 2010), 2010 TNT 103-1, May 28, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
108 Amy S. Elliott, Economic Substance "Angel List" Unlikely, Says Treasury Official,
127 Tax Notes 521, 521 (May 3, 2010).
10 Jeremiah Coder & Amy S. Elliott, Some Economic Substance Guidance Likely, Offi-
cials Say (May 7, 2010), 2010 TNT 89-14, May 10, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File.
110 Amy S. Elliott, Codification of Economic Substance Should Have Minimal Effect on
Practice, IRS Official Says (May 10, 2010), 2010 TNT 90-2, May 11, 2010, available in
LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
Mll LB&I-4-0711-015 (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.irs.govfbusinesses/article/O,,
id=242253,00.html. Practitioners quickly expressed their approval of the directive. Marie
Sapirie & Shamik Trivedi, LB&I Directive Limits Strict Liability Penalties Under Eco-
nomic Substance (July 18, 2011), 2011 TNT 137-1, July 18, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax
Analysts File (quoting Matthew Lerner, Steptoe & Johnson, as saying that "One can see a
real effort to avoid applying the harsh economic substance penalty in uncertain cases.").
112 In the context of the partnership anti-abuse rule, taxpayers initially voiced very simi-
lar concerns about the unfair uncertainty placed on taxpayers and the likely negative im-
pact on garden-variety partnership transactions. See text accompanying notes 66-74.
Though Treasury and IRS officials repeatedly tried to reassure taxpayers that the applica-
tion of the anti-abuse rule would be limited, the Service ultimately had to quell the uproar
with an announcement that agents seeking to apply the rule would have to get approval
from the National Office. Announcement 94-87, 1994-27 I.R.B. 124 (July 5). LB&I re-
leased a similar directive in the context of the economic substance penalty. See LMSB-20-
0910-024 (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.irs.govipub/foia/igImsblmsb-20-0910-
024.pdf (requiring review and approval by Director of Field operations prior to proposal of
economic substance penalty).
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As a result, economic substance codification, at present, is best seen
as yet another example of the harsher penalty application specifically
for abusive, or tax shelter transactions. It should not change the in-
verse relationship between uncertainty and penalty likelihood outside
of the tax shelter context.
Moreover, strategic uncertainty should not even induce taxpayers
who have engaged in tax shelter transactions to report more tax liabil-
ity as a means of reducing potential penalties from the shelter transac-
tions. Tax shelters produce vast tax savings for the taxpayers engaging
in them. Garden-variety tax shelters can produce losses for tax pur-
poses in excess of half a billion dollars, while imposing only relatively
immaterial economic costs on tax shelter participants.'1 3 Importantly,
tax shelters are highly engineered transactions that would not be en-
gaged in if not for the potentially extremely desirable tax outcomes
flowing from such transactions. As a result, once taxpayers have en-
tered into tax shelter transactions, they are going to report the trans-
At least in the context of the partnership anti-abuse rule, this Announcement basically
sounded the death knell for any widespread application of the rule. See Noel B. Cunning-
ham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 59 (2004)
(describing how "[tihe vitriolic outcry of the tax bar against the regulations, coupled with
the Service's statement that its agents will not assert the regulations without the approval
of the National Office, left the lasting impression that the regulations were not valid").
While the economic substance penalty stands on much firmer ground than the partnership
anti-abuse rule because Congress itself enacted the economic substance penalty, the paral-
lels between the objections to the partnership anti-abuse rule and the current objections to
the economic substance penalty nonetheless reveal that it will have to withstand similar
intense pressure from taxpayers designed to limit its application.
The end result appears likely to be a relatively circumscribed economic substance pen-
alty, not a doctrine that applies to routine tax planning transactions. Even tax advisors
who have painted the most dire scenarios about possible application of the economic sub-
stance penalty have intimated that any widespread application would likely be very short
lived. See Monte A. Jackel, Letter to the Editor, (June 14, 2010), 2010 TNT 114-4, June 15,
2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
Similarly, even the most vehement objectors to the partnership anti-abuse regulation
believed that it would likely "be overturned if employed with malice, or with unsound
reasoning, or senseless disregard for the substantive nature of a particular transaction or
set of transactions." Kip Dellinger, The Internal Revenue Service's Power Grab (June 27,
1994), 94 TNT 128-37, July 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. The implication
is that that government simply will not or cannot sustain application of a strict liability
penalty as a general matter under uncertainty; notwithstanding the broadly worded nature
of the economic substance doctrine, a strict liability penalty under this doctrine can only be
applied in the context of tax shelters.
113 Black and Decker Corporation claimed a $560 million capital loss on its tax shelter
transaction, which involved incorporation of a subsidiary with $561 million accompanied
by the subsidiary's assumption of $560 million of contingent liabilities, followed by sale of
the subsidiary for $1 million. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 432
(4th Cir. 2006).
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actions in a manner that is likely to result in the desired tax
outcome. 114
Obtaining the extremely desirable tax outcomes afforded by tax
shelters requires taking an aggressive reporting position, notwith-
standing the potential application of penalties for doing so. Given the
large amount of revenue at stake and the questionable reliance on tax
provisions in a manner unintended by Congress, taxpayers engaging in
tax shelter transactions know that, if detected, the IRS will almost cer-
tainly disallow the results. While taxpayers can fight the disallowance,
once the Service detects the shelter, the taxpayer has lost most of the
battle.115 As a result, once taxpayers engage in a tax shelter transac-
tion, they not only take the advantageous reporting position they hope
to gain by engaging in the tax shelter transaction, but also try to bury
the evidence of it in a voluminous and often confusing tax return, hop-
ing it will never see the light of day. 116
The risk of a penalty is therefore unlikely to cause tax shelter par-
ticipants to abandon their claimed tax shelter benefits on their return
after having decided to engage in such transactions. The tax shelter
context, then, does not change the general conclusion that, under the
current monetary penalty system, taxpayers should be less likely to
report more, and may instead have reason to report less, tax liability
from completed tax transactions in response to strategic uncertainty.
3. Will Monetary Penalties Change?
One possible response to the discussion regarding the monetary tax
penalty system is that, if tax penalties do not currently work as neces-
sary to induce greater tax liability reporting under uncertainty, per-
haps we should change them. A move to a strict liability system of
monetary tax penalties would provide risk-averse taxpayers operating
within an economic framework of reporting stronger reason to report
more tax liability in response to strategic uncertainty.
This argument does not adequately appreciate the low likelihood of
moving to a strict liability system, and therefore the doubtful utility of
strategic uncertainty as a means of increasing revenue by reducing
under-reporting. Understanding why it is unlikely that the United
114 See note 29 for a discussion of some of the arguments for and against using uncer-
tainty to impact decisions about whether and how to structure transactions.
115 Bankman, note 39, at 1782 (indicating tax shelter purchasers' reliance on audit
lottery).
116 See Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Battle, in The Crisis in Tax Administration,
note 4, at 15 ("[F]inding a shelter in a Schedule M for a Fortune 100 company is not easy
work."); Joshua Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1629, 1640-41 (2009) (describing the Service's difficulties in finding tax
shelters hidden inside seemingly normal, and voluminous, tax return information).
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States would broadly adopt a strict liability regime requires a histori-
cal and contextual understanding of the nature of tax penalties.
Modern tax penalties have been fault-based since their inception.117
This scheme reflects a deeply-held belief that penalties should not pe-
nalize taxpayers who could not understand their tax law obligations.
As early as 1921, Senator Reed explained,
I have been informed by people in the collector's office in
Kansas City that there are hundreds of these cases where
men come in and are willing to pay the tax, and have forgot-
ten it for a day or two, and find a penalty stuck on them, and
they simply go out mad and cursing the whole Government.
It is very natural. I think we ought to get away from irrita-
tion where we can. I think if you keep on imposing such
penalties and heavy taxes, everybody is going to hate the
Government anyhow. . . . These people have not read this
law. If they did read it, they could not understand it. It ap-
plies to millions of people to whom it is a hopeless muddle,
and they forget, and then get stuck 5 per cent. It is harsh. It
would be harsh in any law.118
Animated by this sentiment, the penalties have remained funda-
mentally unchanged and fault-based over the history of the Code.
Government bodies have continually linked this deep-seated commit-
ment to fault to the same sentiment expressed by Senator Reed. As
described most succinctly by the Commissioner's Executive Task
Force on Civil Penalties in 1989, "regularly penalizing taxpayers ...
would be considered unfair, would destroy the moral and ethical con-
notations of the penalty, and would ultimately undermine the stan-
dard of behavior."1 19 As a result, the Commissioner's Executive Task
Force believed that penalties should only apply when taxpayers have
"an understanding of [their tax] obligations and they have everything
they need to be able to comply."1 20
117 The first modern penalties arrived with the Federal Revenue Act of 1918, which ap-
plied a negligence penalty at a rate of 5% and a fraud penalty at a rate of 50%. Federal
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083. The Act pro-
vided that "if the return is made in good faith and the understatement of the amount in the
return is not due to any fault of the taxpayer, there shall be no penalty because of such
understatement." Id.
118 An Act to Reduce and Equalize Taxation, to Amend and Simplify The Revenue Act
of 1918, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 8245 Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
67th Cong. 99 (1921) (statement of Sen. Reed).
119 Exec. Task Force for the Comm'r's Penalty Study, IRS, Report on Civil Tax Penalties
ch. 8, § VII.A.1 (1989) [hereinafter Commissioner's Task Force Report].
120 Id. at IV-1.
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The major thrust of penalty changes since the inception of penalties
has been to ensure that penalties apply when taxpayers engage in tax
shelters or particularly aggressive efforts to reduce their tax liability.
This tactic is entirely consistent with a strong commitment to protect-
ing taxpayers who are honestly trying to pay the tax liability they owe,
and therefore supports the general commitment to decreased likeli-
hood of penalties in response to strategic uncertainty. As Dan Kahan
has explained, targeting taxpayers who are clearly dedicated to shirk-
ing their taxpaying duties is an important complement to protecting
taxpayers who do not exhibit such tendencies. 121
The most significant and widespread penalty change since the in-
ception of modern penalties, the substantial understatement penalty,
was prompted by concern about tax shelters.122 Congress made sure
to apply fault-based carveouts for this penalty, explaining that "tax-
payers who take highly aggressive filing positions are penalized while
those who endeavor in good faith to fairly self-assess are not penal-
ized," and additionally providing a waiver for reasonable cause and
good faith (which later became the omnibus defense).123 Most of the
remaining changes in the history of tax penalties have been narrowly
directed at particularly abusive, or tax shelter transactions, such as the
increasingly stringent application of the substantial understatement
penalty to tax shelters, the addition of the § 6662A penalty to reporta-
ble transactions, and economic substance codification. 124
Courts' application of the current penalty provisions also indicates a
strong commitment to the same fault-based principles. A review of
case law reveals that the accuracy penalties operate in two primary
circumstances: when the tax obligation is clear or when the taxpayer
was actively trying to game the system and potentially take unfair ad-
vantage of uncertainties, as in a tax shelter. The first category is by far
121 Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
Mich. L. Rev. 71, 80 (2003).
122 Off. of Tax Pol'y, Treasury Dep't, Report to The Congress on Penalty and Interest
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 97 (1999) available at http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/intpenal.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Study]; Treasury
Dep't, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Pro-
posals, 61 (1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Docu-
ments/ctswhite.pdf (citing substantial understatement penalty as one of the "four principal
procedural measures enacted by Congress to address the individual tax shelters of the
1970s and 1980s").
123 H.R. Rep. No. 97-760, at 575 (1982) (Conf. Rep.); IRC § 6661(c) (repealed 1989).
124 See Subsection III.B.2 for reasons why economic substance codification is likely to
be limited to the tax shelter context and not a paradigm shift in penalty application under
uncertainty. Minor changes have been made to penalties outside the tax shelter context.
For example, prior to 1993 neither the substantial understatement penalty nor the negli-
gence penalty applied to disclosed tax positions that were not frivolous. H.R. Rep. No.
103-111, at 753-55 (1993). In 1993, this standard was changed to the current "reasonable
basis" standard. Id. at 754.
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the most prevalent application of the accuracy penalties. Examples
abound of courts upholding accuracy penalties as a result of seemingly
flagrant violations of clear tax law obligations (including failure to
meet substantiation requirements).125 Presumably, the Service finds it
substantially easier to assess and prove an accuracy penalty rather
than a fraud penalty, even when the circumstances may support the
latter.
The second category is a much less significant but still sizeable num-
ber of cases in which penalties are applied in tax shelter or non-eco-
nomic substance cases, even if the governing law is not entirely
clear.126 This category reflects both the underlying tax law's harsher
application of penalties in tax shelter transactions, and the at times
seemingly independent commitment of the courts to apply penalties
for these transactions. 12 7 It is the rare case that upholds an accuracy
125 See, e.g., Scott v. Commissioner, 352 Fed. App'x. 468, 469 (2d Cir. 2009) (taxpayer
reported zero wages when he earned $61,072 and his only defense was a "specious" argu-
ment that he was not an employee and that his income did not constitute wages); Akers v.
Commissioner, 326 Fed. App'x. 593 (2d Cir. 2009) (taxpayer clearly failed to meet substan-
tiation requirements for deductions); Randall v. Commissioner, 2007 WL 4269061, at *1
(10th Cir. 2007) (taxpayer failed to include income that was included on 1099s); Sadberry
v. Commissioner, 153 Fed. App'x. 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2005) ("any cursory reading" of the
Form 1040 instructions precluded taxpayer's position and his status as an attorney obviated
reasonable cause for failure to comply with the instructions); Jackson v. Commissioner, 50
Fed. App'x. 701, 704 (6th Cir. 2002) (taxpayer took deductions without any documenta-
tion); Toberman v. Commissioner, 294 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2002) (taxpayer failed to
provide any records to substantiate net operating loss carryforwards and did not explain
absence of records); Barmes v. Commissioner, No. 01-3517, 2002 WL 652089 (9th Cir.
2002) (taxpayers' position was frivolous); Sykes v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 12
(2010) (taxpayers submitted no evidence that would defend against the penalty and they
failed to keep adequate books and records that would substantiate the item); Koziej v.
Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-41 (2010) (taxpayer failed to report claimed receipt
of loan payments as income); Elverson v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-36 (2010)
(taxpayer did not produce records to substantiate deductions and Tax Court disbelieved
that they existed); Chow v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1193 (2010) (taxpayers' posi-
tions directly violated applicable tax law or were not substantiated); Conway v. Commis-
sioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-27 (2010) (taxpayer claimed that she did not have to report
rental income received by her son in direct violation of bedrock Lucas v. Earl precedent);
Robert v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1159 (2010) (taxpayer's positions were without
substance and had no support in case law); Prough v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH)
1093 (2010) (taxpayers received direct instructions in conflict with the tax positions they
took); Royster v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077 (2010) (failure to substantiate).
126 See, e.g., Enbridge Energy Co. Inc. v. United States, 354 Fed. App'x. 15 (5th Cir.
2009); Clearmeadow Invs., LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 509 (2009); Stobie Creek Invs.
LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008); Jade Trading LLC v. United States, 80 Fed.
Cl. 11 (2007); Bass v. Commissioner, 322 Fed. App'x. 859 (11th Cir. 2009); Long Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004); In re CM Hold-
ings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002).
127 In Long Term Capital Holdings, the district court made the seemingly categorical
statement, "Since the Court has found that the OTC transaction is devoid of objective
economic substance and subjective business purpose, Long Term has not and cannot cite
authority, much less substantial authority, for the proposition that a taxpayer may claim
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penalty in non-abusive circumstances when the tax law is not clear.128
It is more common for courts to craft judicial exceptions to penalties
to ensure that they cannot apply under uncertainty, in a manner that
seems to go beyond even what the Code and regulations require. 129
The case law and the courts' sentiments expressed therein 30
thereby confirm the fundamental conception of monetary tax penal-
ties as punishments for known or likely wrongdoing. This conception
of monetary penalties appears unlikely to change, reducing the utility
of strategic uncertainty as a means of increasing revenue.
4. Taxpayers' Awareness of Monetary Penalties
An additional objection to the analysis regarding monetary tax pen-
alties and strategic uncertainty is that what matters is whether taxpay-
ers think penalties operate under uncertainty, not whether they
actually do. If taxpayers think that monetary penalties operate ro-
bustly under uncertainty, then taxpayers may have much stronger rea-
son to increase tax liability reporting in response to strategic
uncertainty, even though they would not, were they well-informed.131
losses from a transaction in which the taxpayer intentionally expends far more than could
reasonably be expected to be recouped through non-tax economic returns in a transaction
the sole motivation for which is tax avoidance." Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp.
2d at 204. The district court also chided the taxpayer's lack of good faith as a result of "its
apparent steps to conceal the tax losses . . . to thereby potentially win the audit lottery and
evade IRS detection." Id. at 211.
128 See, e.g., Green v. Commissioner, 507 F.3d 857, 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2007) (substantial
understatement penalty upheld when taxpayer excluded payments from settlement, even
though language relating to the settlement was "less than clear"); Estate of True v. Com-
missioner, 390 F.3d 1210, 1245 (10th Cir. 2004) (upheld penalties when taxpayers relied on
buy-sell agreements to set values notwithstanding that "the parties present comparatively
persuasive arguments in support of their relative positions").
129 William Drennan points to "a string of judicial exceptions" to prevent the application
of penalties when faced with uncertainty. William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax
Penalties, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2009). Exemplifying this phenomenon is the doctrine of
first impression embraced by the Tax Court as well as the courts of appeal. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1954 (2000) (refusing to uphold substantial
understatement penalty applied to a factual issue because the case was one of first impres-
sion "involving the unclear application of an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code").
130 The Second Circuit displayed characteristic anathema to penalty application under
uncertainty when it warned that "the government's bald claim that the taxpayer did not
exercise due care" when the tax law was unclear was "little short of reprehensible."
Holmes v. United States, 85 F.3d 956, 963 n.7 (2d. Cir. 1996).
131 Recently, Joshua Blank and Daniel Levin have provided interesting data indicating
that the government manipulates the release of tax enforcement information to influence
taxpayers' perceptions of penalties and audit rate. Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin,
When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 4-5 (2010). The government
tends to reveal information about criminal and civil injunctions regarding tax fraud, which
is accompanied by severe penalties. Id. at 8. This form of manipulation would seem to
provide taxpayers little information about the nature of tax penalties when the tax law is
uncertain.
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As a result, perhaps strategic uncertainty could increase revenue by
reducing under-reporting, even absent actual robust application of
penalties under uncertainty.
Several responses to this objection are in order. First, the models
that posit that strategic uncertainty may increase revenue rely on as-
sumptions of both highly rational and highly informed taxpayers. Spe-
cifically, under the risk-averse model, taxpayers would have to
appreciate the greater risk imposed by uncertain tax law and the abil-
ity to mitigate the risk by higher tax reporting. Under the interactive
model, taxpayers would have to be able to analyze how the Service
might react to greater tax law uncertainty and respond accordingly.
If we are to apply these assumptions, then applying the lesser as-
sumption that taxpayers have an understanding of how tax penalties
operate seems reasonable. The application of penalties under uncer-
tainty is clear from publicly available statutes and regulations. As a
result, tax administrators should not adopt strategic uncertainty as a
compliance tool based on an assumption of hyper-rational and in-
formed taxpayer behavior without an accompanying assumption that
taxpayers will understand the operation of the penalty provisions
under uncertainty.
Additionally, some empirical evidence supports the notion that tax-
payers do believe that there is some incentive to report less tax liabil-
ity as uncertainty increases. Steven Klepper and Daniel Nagin
obtained access to taxpayer reporting data through the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program ("TCMP") to conduct studies re-
garding taxpayer reporting when tax law is uncertain. 132 Klepper and
Nagin characterized this uncertainty (or in their terms "ambiguous"
tax items) based on whether or not a tax issue required a valuation,
which they viewed as inherently susceptible to dispute, and based on
how many revenue rulings the Service had issued with respect to a tax
question.133 The Service issues revenue rulings to eliminate uncer-
tainty regarding how the tax law applies in specific factual situa-
132 Information regarding actual taxpayer reporting behavior is very difficult to obtain.
The most reliable source of information comes from the TCMP, which was a program in
which the IRS conducted intensive audits of randomly selected taxpayers during various
tax years between 1963 and 1988. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Re-
search Program: Measuring Taxpayer Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev.
1255, 1261-62 (2003). The program, which was designed to develop information about tax-
payer compliance and sharpen IRS audit selection formulas and techniques, was discontin-
ued due to a variety of factors including general discontent with the IRS. Id. at 1262-63.
The Service has strictly restricted access to TCMP data, limiting the empirical observations
that can be made regarding taxpayer compliance under a variety of circumstances. See,
e.g., Raskolnikov, note 38, at 590 (describing the "extreme secrecy" of the Service with
respect to TCMP data).
133 Klepper & Nagin, note 10, at 13.
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tions.13 4 Klepper and Nagin measured the number of revenue rulings
for particular tax items from the year of the tax return and the two
subsequent years, to capture the uncertainty which existed at the time
of tax return filing.135 While not a perfect measure of tax law uncer-
tainty,136 the methodology produced an interesting conclusion. Klep-
per and Nagin found a significant positive correlation between the
ambiguity of an item and noncompliance. 137
While these results do not isolate the impact of monetary tax penal-
ties under uncertainty on reporting behavior, the results are at least
consistent with taxpayers actually being affected by monetary tax pen-
alty operation under uncertainty.138 Given the importance of mone-
tary tax penalties as an incentive in taxpayers' reporting decisions,
penalties are likely to be at least a partial explanation for the Klepper
and Nagin results. As a result, while it may be difficult to say with
certainty what taxpayers' beliefs are about monetary tax penalty oper-
ation under uncertainty, the actual operation of monetary tax penal-
ties under uncertainty, combined with indications that taxpayers act
consistently with this operation, counsels against adoption of strategic
uncertainty as a means of raising revenue.
5. Noneconomic Incentives
In addition to responding to monetary tax penalties, taxpayers re-
spond to noneconomic incentives to report tax liability. While pure
economic models of taxpayer reporting behavior do not consider the
impact of noneconomic incentives, scholars in an increasingly vast
literature have posited that some sort of norms, duties, compulsions,
134 Michael I. Saltzman & Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure 1 3.03[1] (2009).
135 Klepper & Nagin, note 10.
136 Most notably, the Service may not issue revenue rulings on questions that raise in-
herently factual issues, such as whether a taxpayer has sufficient business purpose to obtain
desirable tax treatment for a given transaction. The lack of revenue rulings on the subject
does not mean that taxpayers have certainty. Nonetheless, as a rough measure of uncer-
tainty, Klepper and Nagin's method is useful.
137 Klepper & Nagin, note 10, at 14.
138 Interestingly, experimental evidence regarding taxpayer reporting under uncertainty
is mixed. Compare Paul Beck, Jon Davis & Woon-Oh Jung, Experimental Evidence on
Taxpayer Reporting Under Uncertainty, 66 Acct. Rev. 535, 549 (1991) (finding some evi-
dence of decrease in reported income as uncertainty decreased with induced risk aversion),
with James Alm, Todd Cherry, Michael Jones & Michael McKee, 31 J. Econ. Psychol. 577,
583 (2010) (finding that uncertainty reduced tax liability reporting). The difference be-
tween these two results may be explained by induced risk aversion in the first experiment
and the potential lack of risk aversion in the latter. Significantly, both sets of experiments
relied on mean-preserving spreads to manipulate uncertainty, and they both used strict
liability penalties. Neither incorporated the role of private tax advisors in advising about
uncertainty. These features make these experiments less useful for predicting the impact
of uncertainty in the real world tax compliance framework.
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or other noneconomic incentives partially must cause taxpayers to pay
taxes. 139 These noneconomic incentives are often seen as a comple-
ment to the economic models.140 The operation of these noneconomic
incentives in response to strategic uncertainty may provide taxpayers
even greater reason to report less, rather than more, tax liability as tax
law uncertainty increases.
While little consensus exists regarding exactly how noneconomic in-
centives influence taxpayer reporting, 141 they clearly influence report-
ing to some extent. 142 These mechanisms may include a desire to
return the government's cooperation, a desire to reciprocate the tax-
paying of one's fellow citizens, a more general duty to obey the law, or
some combination thereof. For example, Dennis Ventry suggests that
taxpayer behavior responds to the fairness of government
processes.143 Dan Kahan posits that a taxpayer is a "moral and emo-
tional reciprocator," who pays taxes out of some sense of guilt or
shame if others are believed to be paying taxes, but reciprocates per-
ceived failure to pay taxes with failure to pay in order to avoid feeling
like a "sucker."' 44 Michael Doran suggests that perhaps the firmest
taxpaying norm is the desire to honor "legitimate legal obligations." 1 4 5
Little work has been done regarding the impact of uncertainty on
these mechanisms. 146 Strategic uncertainty, however, likely reduces
taxpayers' noneconomic incentives to pay taxes.147 To the extent that
139 See, e.g., Doran, note 86, at 112; Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Tax-
payer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 696-97 (2009); Joel
Slemrod, Introduction to Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance:
Recommendations for the IRS, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 599, 612-13 (2007); Dan M. Kahan, Trust,
Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333, 340-44 (2001).
140 Doran, note 86, at 131-32 (describing the norms model as complementing the deter-
rence model).
141 For an erudite summary of the various norms or factors that may impact taxpayer
reporting accompanied by a critical appraisal of whether the norms literature can help
improve compliance, see id. at 131-38.
142 See Raskolnikov, note 139, at 695-96 (noting that "it is beyond doubt" that the deter-
rence model based on fines and audit rate "fails to describe the behavior of many individu-
als" since "numerous taxpayers comply with tax law even though they have a clear
opportunity to evade or avoid their obligations"). Scholars fundamentally base this con-
clusion on the surprisingly high rate of voluntary compliance (The Office of Tax Policy
recently estimated voluntary compliance as being between 83.7% and 86.3%) given the
low audit and monetary penalty rates. Off. of Tax Pol'y, Treasury Dep't, A Comprehensive
Strategy for Reducing the Tax Gap 5 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/
tax-gap-report-final_080207_linked.pdf
143 Dennis J. Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 431, 439 (2008).
144 Kahan, note 121, at 81.
145 Doran, note 86, at 137.
146 See Gergen, note 4, at 421.
147 For a similar view, see Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabili-
ties Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 980, 1012-13 (2009) (pointing to nondeterrence
theories of compliance and explaining that "the use of legal uncertainty as a revenue-en-
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taxpayers pay taxes because of a desire to cooperate with the govern-
ment, strategically increasing uncertainty may be seen as an uncooper-
ative act by the government, resulting in less cooperation by
taxpayers. 148 In this regard, taxpayers may view high levels of tax law
uncertainty as fundamentally unfair and may respond by shirking their
taxpaying obligations to a greater extent. 149 To the extent that taxpay-
ers pay taxes as a result of a desire to reciprocate one's fellow citizens'
taxpaying, strategic uncertainty may place into doubt other citizens'
reporting decisions and thereby reduce a taxpayer's taxpaying recipro-
cation. To the extent that taxpayers pay taxes as a result of a duty to
obey the law, making the law less clear may reduce certainty regard-
ing the taxpayer's commitment and thereby undermine such
commitment. 5 0
The reduced operation of these noneconomic incentives to pay
taxes in response to strategic uncertainty would magnify the impact of
monetary tax penalties on reporting. As a result, a reduced likelihood
of tax penalties, potentially combined with the reduced operation of
noneconomic incentives to pay taxes, may provide taxpayers with im-
petus to report less, rather than more, tax liability in response to stra-
tegic uncertainty.
6. Nontax Financial Reporting Costs
Notwithstanding the reduced operation of tax penalties (and, poten-
tially, noneconomic incentives to report tax liability), if nontax finan-
cial reporting costs induce taxpayers to report higher tax liability on
hancing policy tool might turn out to be counterproductive, driving people to report lower
incomes in part because they will be able to justify this act to themselves and might expect
others to behave similarly").
148 As an example, Blank details how uncertainty with respect to the tax shelter disclo-
sure rules results in the uncooperative act of overdisclosure. Blank, note 116, at 1632.
Conservative taxpayers respond to the uncertainty by overdisclosing out of caution, while
aggressive types respond to the uncertainty by overdisclosing as a tactic to conceal tax
shelter transactions. Id.
149 In the context of the partnership anti-abuse regulation, taxpayers reacted to the level
of uncertainty by claiming that the government was violating duties owed to taxpayers. In
one particularly colorful commentary, a tax practitioner expressed the reaction that,
The problem with an open-ended ambiguous regulation like that proposed is
what it signifies about the direction of the administration of our federal tax
system and the attitudes of those who administer the law. It says that we may
be headed into an abyss that has gobbled up many countries and where none
has survived.
Dellinger, note 112, at 4.
1so The difficulty with determining the impact of this noneconomic incentive under un-
certainty in particular is that, even if one's desire to obey the law is a fundamental reason
for paying taxes, this motivation becomes a "black box" not particularly susceptible to
empirical investigation. Doran, note 86, at 137-38.
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their tax returns as uncertainty increases, then taxpayers may still re-
port higher tax liability on their tax returns in response to strategic
uncertainty. Recently promulgated nontax financial reporting rules,
backed by a new tax reporting regime, do impose new and potentially
significant costs on taxpayers. Nevertheless, these rules should not
cause taxpayers to report higher tax liability on their tax returns in
response to strategic uncertainty.
In 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB")
changed the landscape of accounting for uncertain tax positions by
issuing Financial Interpretive Statement 48 ("FIN 48").151 FIN 48's
purpose is to ensure that companies with financial statements subject
to FASB rules comparably account for uncertain tax positions on their
financial statements.152 FIN 48 creates a two-step process to evaluate
tax positions for financial statement purposes. In the first step (the
"recognition step"), the company must evaluate the technical merits
of the tax position and determine whether the position is more likely
than not to be sustained (the "more likely than not" standard). 53 If a
position is more likely than not to be sustained, then, in the second
step, the company must determine the largest amount of the tax bene-
fit from the position that has a greater than 50% likelihood of being
realized upon settlement. 154 The company must create a reserve on
the financial statement for tax benefits that fail either part of this two-
part test.'55
The Service has recently instituted a new set of reporting require-
ments designed to capitalize on FIN 48. The Service now requires
certain corporations that file audited financial statements and that
meet certain asset thresholds to file a schedule of uncertain tax posi-
tions ("Schedule UTP") with their tax returns, providing a concise
summary of the uncertain tax positions on the tax return and ranking
them from highest to lowest reserve amounts. 156 Uncertain positions,
for this purpose, are positions for which the corporation has recorded
a reserve on audited financial statements, or for which the corporation
did not record a reserve because it expects to litigate (and win) the
position.157 The Service has indicated that, while it will not immedi-
151 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, FASB
Interpretation No. 48 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdflfin%2048.pdf.
152 Id. at Summary.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. The taxpayer need not set up a reserve if it expects to litigate (and win) the issue.
Id. at 11.
156 See IRS, 2010 1120 Instructions 1, 3, 4 (2010); Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41
I.R.B. 428, 429 (Oct. 12).
157 IRS, note 156, at 2.
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ately propose adjustments based on a taxpayer's Schedule UTP,158 it
will rely upon Schedule UTP to focus its audit resources. 159
The combination of FIN 48 and Schedule UTP increases costs on
taxpayers. Specifically, prior to FIN 48/Schedule UTP, taxpayers with
audited financial statements had a much greater ability to take aggres-
sive tax positions, which were unlikely to be sustained, and claim the
benefits of such positions for financial accounting purposes. Taxpay-
ers could rely on the audit lottery to hopefully prevent the issues from
seeing the light of day, thereby permanently ensconcing the tax reduc-
tion. Under FIN 48/Schedule UTP, if a company with audited finan-
cial statements wants to take a tax position with a very low likelihood
of success, it should have to place a reserve on its financial statements
for such position, thereby reducing the strength of its financial state-
ments. The company would also have to notify the Service of the po-
sition on Schedule UTP, presumably attracting audit attention and
increasing the likelihood of disallowance. 160
158 Jeremiah Coder, Malloy Tells Tax Executives to End Skepticism of Uncertain Tax
Position Reporting (Apr. 13, 2010), 2010 TNT 71-2, Apr. 14, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax
Analysts File. Tax advisors have doubted the veracity of this claim. See, e.g., Attorneys
Suggest Changes to UTP Reporting Proposal (June 1, 2010), 2010 TNT 111-26, June 10,
2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
159 See, e.g., Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408, 409 (Jan. 26) (indicating that the
new disclosure will allow the Service to focus its resources on uncertain positions of suffi-
cient magnitude); Jeremiah Coder, Shulman Announces Proposal for Reporting Uncertain
Tax Positions (Jan. 26, 2010), 2010 TNT 17-2, Jan. 27, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Ana-
lysts File ("The IRS believes that better and more complete information regarding the
nature and materiality of a company's uncertain tax positions will cut down on the time it
takes to both find an issue and complete the audit . . . .").
160 Other alternatives are possible. Since the disclosure obligation keys off of reserves
for financial accounting purposes, practitioners have warned that the UTP Schedule will
merely cause taxpayers to take more aggressive financial accounting positions. See, e.g.,
Jeremiah Coder, Wilkins Discusses Need for Uncertain Tax Position Reporting (Mar. 2,
2010), 2010 TNT 41-2, Mar. 3, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (quoting Phillip
A. Pillar of Greenberg Traurig LLP stating that the Schedule UTP may have the ironic
result of reducing the number of uncertain tax positions for financial accounting purposes).
Alternatively, taxpayers could simply have disparate responses to the reporting regimes,
whereby conservative taxpayers have a strong incentive to disclose positions, thereby di-
verting audit resources toward conservative taxpayers. At the same time, more aggressive
taxpayers' uncertain (and undisclosed) positions could be less likely to be examined. Some
empirical evidence exists that supports this concern. Alexander Edwards, Allison Koester,
and Terry Shelvin examined the S&P index during the three days surrounding the release
of the Schedule UTP announcement. Alexander Edwards, Allison Koester & Terry Shev-
lin, Examining Investor Reaction to IRS Announcement 2010-09, 127 Tax Notes 669, 671
(May 10, 2010). They found that stock prices generally did not respond to the release,
indicating that stockholders did not believe it would impact tax compliance or tax costs.
Id. at 673. They found no significant relationship between firms with large uncertain tax
positions for financial accounting positions and stock price surrounding the announcement.
Id. at 671-72. They did find a significant but negative relationship between stock prices and
current effective tax rates, indicating that firms with low effective tax rates (likely resulting
from aggressive positions) favorably viewed the announcement. Id. at 672-73. They hy-
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Even though these reporting rules increase the costs of taking an
uncertain tax position,161 increasing uncertainty under the new report-
ing regime should not cause taxpayers to report higher tax liability on
their tax returns. It is easiest to understand this proposition by way of
example. Imagine two different taxpayers, A and B. Prior to imposi-
tion of strategic uncertainty, A believed that she had a 40% chance of
being able to claim entitlement to a particular tax benefit. B believed
that she had a 60% chance of being entitled to the tax benefit. Addi-
tionally, B determined that the amounts and probabilities of the possi-
ble estimated tax benefit outcomes are as follows:
TABLE 1
Individual Cumulative
Possible Estimated Probability of Probability of




Under FIN 48, the reserve requirements would be as follows. Since
A's position does not meet the more-likely-than-not standard, A
would not be entitled to recognize a tax benefit for financial reporting
purposes, and therefore would be required to create a reserve for the
entire tax position. Since B's position meets the more-likely-than-not
threshold and $50 is the largest amount that is greater than 50% likely
of being realized upon settlement, B would be entitled to recognize a
tax benefit of $50 and would have to create a reserve for the remain-
ing amount.162
Now imagine that tax administrators rely on strategic uncertainty.
As a result, taxpayers have less guidance but do not face guidance
skewed in one direction or the other. Simply withholding guidance
without skewing it in one direction or another should not clearly
change the result under either the recognition or measurement step of
FIN 48. As a result, taxpayers may not experience different FIN 48 or
Schedule UTP results as a result of strategic uncertainty.
pothesized that these firms anticipated that the Service would shift its audit resources away
from firms with low effective tax rates toward firms with disclosed UTPs. Id. at 673.
161 An uncertain tax position, for this purpose, would be any tax position that does not
meet the more-likely-than-not standard or any portion of a tax benefit that does not have a
greater than 50% likelihood of being realized on settlement. In this regard, the term "un-
certain tax position," adopted by both FIN 48 and Schedule UTP, is really a misnomer.
The more accurate description should be "unlikely tax position."
162 See FIN 48, note 151, at 16-17, for examples of this calculation.
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As to the recognition step, A and B may experience ambiguity re-
garding the percentage chance of being entitled to the benefit. That
is, with less guidance, but without guidance skewed in either direction,
A and B may maintain that, if pressed, they would still have 40% and
60% respective chances of being entitled to their tax benefits, but may
simply be less confident in these precise measures. If this is the case,
then A still does not get to recognize any benefit for financial report-
ing purposes, the same conclusion as existed without strategic uncer-
tainty. B may be able to claim that, although not sure, her best guess
is still that she has a 60% chance of being entitled to the tax benefit.
As a result, she may still proceed to the measurement step.
At the measurement step, B may perceive that strategic uncertainty
has increased the range of potential outcomes. For example, it is pos-
sible that under strategic uncertainty, without making B better or
worse off, a greater range of potential outcomes exists. So, B may
now determine that the amounts and probabilities of the possible esti-
mated tax benefit outcomes are as follows:
TABLE 2
Individual Cumulative
Possible Estimated Probability of Probability of






In this case, since $50 is still the largest amount that is greater than
50% likely of being realized upon settlement, B would still be entitled
to recognize a tax benefit of $50. In short, because strategic uncer-
tainty would have merely decreased clarity without skewing expected
tax liability one way or another, B would have a plausible claim to end
up with the same tax benefit for financial reporting purposes as under
less uncertainty. A would remain disentitled to claim the tax benefit
in either case. As a result, strategic uncertainty would not impose
greater financial reporting costs on either taxpayer.
Even if B felt disentitled to claim the same tax benefit for financial
reporting purposes as prior to the strategic uncertainty, B may still
take the position on its tax return. Imagine that B simply could not
convince the company's auditor that B should still meet the more-
likely-than-not threshold. For example, imagine that tax administra-
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tors hold back almost entirely on guidance regarding a particular is-
sue. In this case, an auditor may conclude that the lack of guidance
forecloses coming to a more-likely-than-not decision that B is entitled
to the benefit. Even in this case, B would still have significant reason
to take the position on its tax return. As discussed previously, given
the uncertainty in this case, B would be unlikely to suffer a penalty.
Additionally, if B ultimately settles the issue in B's favor with the IRS,
or if the statute of limitations period for the position simply closes
without adjustment by the Service, then B can then also take the ben-
efit for financial statement purposes. 163
In sum, while recently enacted FIN 48 and Schedule UTP increase
costs on companies, the introduction of strategic uncertainty would
not necessarily dictate a more disadvantageous financial reporting re-
sult under the new reporting regime and should not significantly skew
taxpayers' tax return reporting incentives. As a result, the FIN 48/
Schedule UTP regime should not serve as a nontax penalty that would
induce higher tax liability reporting on tax returns in response to stra-
tegic uncertainty. Rather, as a result of reduced tax penalties and,
potentially, noneconomic incentives to report tax liability, taxpayers
should have lower impetus to report more tax liability in response to
strategic uncertainty and may have impetus to report less tax liability
instead.
C. Tactical Factors May Cause Strategic Uncertainty to Decrease
Rather than Increase Revenue
A third reason why strategic uncertainty may not increase revenue
by reducing under-reporting is because tactical factors may weigh
against increased tax liability reporting and may instead have the op-
posite result. Interactive models of taxpayer reporting suggest that
taxpayers may have an incentive to report more of the tax liability
that they owe in response to strategic uncertainty if they believed that
the Service would increase audits as a result of a perceived greater
benefit from auditing under greater uncertainty. Taxpayers would re-
spond by reporting more tax liability to avoid the higher chance of
audit.
While this argument has some appeal, other tactical factors may
cause the opposite effect. Specifically, limitations on the Service's au-
dit abilities, negotiating opportunities afforded by greater tax law un-
certainty, and the influence of professional tax return preparers may
cause taxpayers to report less, rather than more, tax liability in re-
sponse to strategic uncertainty. Tactical factors therefore cast doubt
163 FIN 48, note 151, at 3.
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on the ability of strategic uncertainty to raise revenue by reducing
underreporting.
1. Audit Rate
In order for taxpayers to report more tax liability in response to
strategic uncertainty under an interactive model, taxpayers would
have to believe that greater tax law uncertainty increased the possibil-
ity of audit.'64 Practical constraints on the IRS, however, make it very
unlikely that the audit rate would increase in response to the level of
tax law uncertainty. These limitations should dampen taxpayers' in-
centives to report more of the tax liability that they owe under an
interactive model in response to strategic uncertainty.
Interactive models often assume that the Service chooses an audit
rate that maximizes revenue collection, given the various tax enforce-
ment parameters. If an aspect of the tax enforcement system changes,
then the assumption is that the Service is free to change its audit rate
in order to capitalize on the new auditing incentives.
The introduction of a binding budget constraint can, at times, have
a drastic impact on the predictions of these models.165 In the context
of strategic uncertainty, budgetary and political constraints on the IRS
are likely to limit the Service's ability to tailor the audit rate to levels
of uncertainty. Strong evidence suggests that the Service faces politi-
cal and budget constraints that dictate the audit rate. As an initial
matter, the audit rate is notoriously extremely low, with audit rates
currently as low as 1.03% for individuals. 166 As commentators have
noted, little political will exists for increasing the audit rate,167 even in
circumstances in which taxpayers are clearly evading tax.168 This is
unlikely to increase in response to greater tax law uncertainty.
Numerous examples illustrate Congress' resistance to increasing the
IRS's tax enforcement budget, even when doing so would directly and
easily raise revenue. For example, recently the Service has outsourced
collection of small tax debts to private companies even when hiring
16 See, e.g., Beck & Jung, note 44, at 478 (discussing higher audit probability).
165 In the taxpayer reporting model with discrete tax outcomes set forth by Graetz, Re-
inganum, and Wilde, for example, introduction of a binding budget constraint resulted in
the prediction of total noncompliance by strategic taxpayers who had high income. Graetz
et al., note 37, at 25.
166 IRS, Fiscal Year 2009 Enforcement Results 2, 4 (2009), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-drop/fy_2009_enforcement results.pdf.
167 Raskolnikov, note 139, at 716 ("If decades of stagnant or falling audit rates suggest
anything, it is that a substantial increase in audit coverage is highly unlikely.").
168 See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy,
117 Tax Notes 506, 516 (Oct. 29, 2007) (discussing lack of political support for audit
expansion).
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more revenue officers to do the same job would raise substantially
more revenue at substantially lower cost. 169 Indeed, even though
Congress was aware of the greater revenue-raising potential from hir-
ing more revenue officers to collect small tax debts, Congress refused
to provide the funding necessary to allow the IRS to do the collections
itself.170
The lesson is that the Service already has very strong incentives to
increase its enforcement efforts, including the audit rate, and yet polit-
ical and budget constraints prevent realization of these incentives.171
The introduction of strategic uncertainty is not likely to overcome
those barriers. As a result, fear of a higher audit rate becomes an
unlikely impetus for taxpayers to increase their tax liability
reporting. 172
2. Negotiation Tactics
Even if strategic uncertainty caused taxpayers to fear an increasing
chance of audit, the impact on taxpayer reporting is unclear. Increas-
ing the fear of audit through strategic uncertainty may cause taxpayers
to report less, rather than more, tax liability. The reason is because
the increased chance of audit triggers two counterbalancing factors:
the desire to report more tax liability to avoid the greater chance of
audit and the desire to report less tax liability in order to influence the
final outcome in case an audit actually occurs. Using strategic uncer-
tainty as the impetus for greater perceived chance of audit may cause
the latter factor to dominate, and therefore may cause reported tax
liability to decrease.
169 See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Enlists Outside Help in Collecting Delinquent Taxes,
Despite the Higher Costs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2006, at A12 (reporting that "[t]he private
debt collection program is expected to bring in $1.4 billion over 10 years, with the collec-
tion agencies keeping about $330 million of that, or 22 to 24 cents on the dollar," whereas
"[bly hiring more revenue officers, the I.R.S. could collect more than $9 billion each year
and spend only $296 million-or about three cents on the dollar").
170 Id.
171 Service officials have repeatedly voiced a desire for more enforcement resources.
For example, when discussing the 2001 tax gap estimate, Commissioner Mark Everson
pressed for more enforcement resources, arguing that "over a quarter-trillion dollars . . . is
way too much money to leave on the table." Stephen Joyce, 2001 Tax Gap Found to Ex-
ceed $310 Billion; Everson Uses Research to Press for Funding, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Mar. 30, 2005, at G-11.
172 The Service's stated intention of using Schedule UTP to focus its audit resources on
existing uncertainties is distinct from the ability of the Service to increase the audit rate
generally in response to generally increased uncertainty. If the government strategically
increased uncertainty across the Code, then taxpayers would have to believe that the Ser-
vice could generally increase the audit rate in order to believe that the higher level of
uncertainty would mean a higher chance of audit.
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The key intuition here is that perceived increased audit probability
not only encourages taxpayers to report more tax liability in order to
avoid the chance of audit, but also encourages taxpayers to report less
tax liability to influence the ultimate outcome should an audit occur.
By reporting a low amount of tax liability, taxpayers may influence
the ultimate outcome should an audit occur because of a psychological
phenomenon called the "anchoring effect."173 Under the anchoring
effect, negotiators are heavily influenced by the first proposal in a ne-
gotiation. 174 As a result, a taxpayer may report low tax liability on a
tax return in case an audit occurs, in hopes of lowering the ultimate
amount of taxes the Service ultimately asserts that the taxpayer owes.
An interesting controlled experiment conducted in Minnesota sug-
gests this potential result. In this experiment, a group of taxpayers
received a letter warning that their tax returns would be "closely ex-
amined." While low- and middle-income taxpayers who received this
letter reported a small amount more tax liability in relation to their
prior year's tax report, relative to control taxpayers who did not re-
ceive the letter, high-income taxpayers reported substantially less tax
liability in relation to their prior year's tax report, relative to those
who did not receive the letter.175 A hypothesis suggested by these
findings was that the high-income taxpayers, promised a searching au-
dit, may have believed that they could influence the ultimate audit
outcome by initially reporting lower tax liability.176
The incentive to report less tax liability as an anchoring tactic makes
significantly more sense as tax law uncertainty increases. While tax-
payers who are certain of their tax liabilities may imagine that the
Service cannot detect all evasion, and thus some benefit may exist
from reporting lower tax liability to start audit adjustments from a
lower point,'77 the downside from understating tax liability known to
be owed is clear from a tactical perspective. If the Service does catch
173 Cognitive psychologists Amon Tversky and Daniel Kahneman identified the anchor-
ing effect in the 1970's, as an important heuristic principle that affects judgments and deci-
sion making. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128-30 (1974).
174 An oft-cited use of the anchoring effect is car dealerships' pricing of cars above the
likely sales price in order to anchor the negotiations. In a meta-analysis of studies measur-
ing the impact of the anchoring effect in negotiations, Dan Orr and Chris Guthrie found
that "anchoring has a powerful impact on negotiation outcomes." Dan Orr & Chris Guth-
rie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analy-
sis, 21 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 597, 598 (2006).
175 Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian, Taxpayer Response to an
Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79
J. Pub. Econ. 455, 457 (2001).
176 Id. at 482.
177 See id. (suggesting that the high-income taxpayers in the Minnesota experiment may
have thought as much).
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clear tax evasion on audit, the taxpayer will have little room to negoti-
ate with the Service. The taxpayer would be branded a tax evader in
the eyes of the auditing agent who has discretion over the rest of the
return, as well as in the eyes of potential appeals officers or judges
who might review other aspects of the tax return.178 Additionally, the
Code codifies this distrust of taxpayers who are clearly caught hiding
tax liability by subjecting such taxpayers to more searching audit re-
view. Taxpayers who fail to report a substantial item on their return
entirely or engage in fraudulent under-reporting are subject to an ex-
tended statute of limitations of six years, or indefinitely, respectively,
as compared to a normal statute of limitations of three years.179 These
extended statutes of limitations allow the auditor to subject the tax-
payer to an unusual amount of scrutiny, for a lengthy period of time.
As a result, while reporting lower tax liability may influence the out-
come on audit, under-reporting carries serious risks and may not be as
beneficial when the tax law is clear.
Under tax law uncertainty, on the other hand, the taxpayer faces
much less strategic downside from reporting less tax liability, and in-
stead may experience much upside as a negotiation tactic. As a result,
as uncertainty increases, taxpayers may be much more likely to report
low tax liability, in order to improve their starting position and negoti-
ation posturing should the taxpayer end up being audited. If the Ser-
vice questions a low tax liability report, but the report remains within
the confines of the tax law, the Service has little leverage to demand a
higher payment. Absent an ultimate decision by a court, the resolu-
tion of any tax issue subject to uncertainty merely becomes a matter
of negotiation between the Service and the taxpayer. Whether the
Service ultimately can capture a significant amount of this bargaining
surplus or not,180 the taxpayer still has much to gain by reporting as
low as possible within the confines of uncertainty.
Importantly, by engaging in this strategy, as long as the taxpayer's
position is not identified as a tax shelter,181 the taxpayer has little rea-
178 The case law discussed above at Subsection III.D.3 indicates that the Service and
courts are willing to make income adjustments and apply penalties for known violations of
tax law.
179 IRC § 6501.
180 David Weisbach suggests the taxpayers may be able to capture the majority of this
surplus. Weisbach, note 4, at 250-51.
181 As explained previously in Subsection III.D.2, the U.S. tax system has developed a
different perception of tax shelters than non-shelter planning, even though tax shelters are
arguably subject to legal uncertainty, such as whether and when benefits achieved through
literal interpretations of the law are subject to disallowance as a result of broader stan-
dards. As explained in Section III.D.2, tax shelter participants do not get benefits that
accompany most tax planning under uncertainty, including low likelihood of penalties. In
the context of strategic interaction with the Service, finding a tax shelter is likely to cause
the Service to examine the tax return intensively. Indeed, the Service generally has a pol-
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
533
534 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:
son to fear being branded a tax cheat whose entire return (and poten-
tially returns from prior years) must be examined intensively in
response to low reporting. Indeed, as long as the taxpayer provides
the Service a clue as to the item in question and does not engage in
fraud, an extended statute of limitations will not apply for the tax
year. For example, if a taxpayer receives nonmonetary compensation
from an employer and under-reports the value of the compensation
on the income tax return, relative to the assessed value on audit, the
taxpayer is not subject to the extended statute of limitations because
reporting the item (even while under-reporting the value) apprised
the Service of the item in question. 182 Reporting less tax liability be-
comes more attractive as a negotiation tactic in case an audit actually
occurs as uncertainty increases. The result may be less, rather than
more, reported tax liability in response to strategic uncertainty. As a
result, even if taxpayers perceived a higher audit rate under strategic
uncertainty, the result still may be less, rather than more, tax
reporting.
3. Professional Tax Return Preparers
The involvement of professional tax return preparers may com-
pound the response of reporting less, rather than more, tax liability in
response to strategic uncertainty.183 Researchers have posited two
icy of restraint, whereby it will not request the tax accrual papers that taxpayers use to
prepare financial disclosure regarding uncertain tax positions. The Service has a notable
exception to this policy. When the taxpayer engages in a listed transaction (which is a
transaction the Service believes to be a tax shelter transaction), the Service will request tax
accrual papers. The extent of the request will depend on the extent of the taxpayer's par-
ticipation in and failure to report listed transactions. I.R.M. 4.10.20.3 (2004). As a result,
in this context, tax shelters stand as a notable exception to the general phenomenon that
reporting less tax liability under uncertainty likely would not result in the taxpayer being
branded a cheat subject to searching review. The sharply different treatment of tax shel-
ters in various tax compliance settings (such as penalties and audit incentives) merits fur-
ther consideration in a future work.
182 IRC § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii); Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) (indicat-
ing that an entire item must be omitted for the six-year substantial omission statute of
limitations to apply).
183 This discussion focuses on paid preparers, who remain by far the greatest source of
tax return preparation. Internal Revenue Service, Return Preparer Review (Dec. 2009),
2010 TNT 2-62, Jan. 4, 2010, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File [hereinafter Return
Preparer Review]. While taxpayers currently rely on tax preparation software to prepare
only a minority of tax returns, its use is clearly on the rise. Interestingly, however, the
impact of tax preparation software on compliance remains a very understudied question.
See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and
Tax Evasion, 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 37, 55 n.60 (2009) ("leav[ing] open the question of
whether technology has caused cheating to decrease over time"). Notably, in its recent
study of return preparers, the Service both acknowledged the increasing role that tax prep-
aration software plays and yet noted that "there have been few studies completed on the
quality and accuracy of tax preparation software" and, as a result, "no consensus" exists
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main reasons why taxpayers seek the assistance of professional tax
return preparers (including attorneys, accountants, and other return
preparers such as bookkeepers or national tax services). The first rea-
son is to obtain advice when the tax law is uncertain. The second is a
desire not to spend time on tax preparation. 18 4 These reasons are gen-
erally consistent with studies repeatedly finding that taxpayers with
self-employment income and taxpayers who are required to file more
forms and schedules have an increasing likelihood of using profes-
sional tax return preparers to prepare their tax returns.1s5 While un-
certainty can impact even a simple return, the impact is almost
certainly more pervasive as a tax return becomes more intricate. As a
result, taxpayers with more complicated returns are likely affected by
uncertainty to a greater degree, at least partially explaining their
greater use of tax return preparer services. Indeed, Klepper, Mazur,
and Nagin found in a study using TCMP data that tax returns pre-
pared by professional tax return preparers tended to face a dispropor-
tionate amount of tax law uncertainty.186
In accordance with taxpayers' tendencies to seek tax return
preparer services when tax law is uncertain, strategic uncertainty may
cause taxpayers to seek out a greater amount of advice from profes-
sional tax return preparers. The increased use of professional tax re-
turn preparers in response to strategic uncertainty may have a
compounding effect. Empirical studies of TCMP data have revealed
that the use of professional tax return preparers is correlated with
lower reporting for uncertain tax items. In their study regarding tax-
payer reporting under uncertainty, Klepper and Nagin found that pro-
fessional tax return preparers contributed to more aggressive
reporting by taxpayers on ambiguous tax issues, counterbalanced by
their tendency to induce greater compliance with legally unambiguous
tax questions.187 Other studies have linked professional tax return
regarding "whether enhanced regulation of the tax preparation software industry is neces-
sary." Return Preparer Review, supra, at 39. As the use of tax preparation software con-
tinues to increase, its impact on compliance will become increasingly important. Future
research should focus on this growing facet of tax compliance.
18 Blumenthal & Christian, note 4, at 203.
185 See, e.g., Charles W. Christian, Sanjay Gupta & Suming Lin, Determinants of Tax
Preparer Usage: Evidence from Panel Data, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 487, 499 (1993) (both conclud-
ing as much and cataloguing other studies that have reached the same findings).
186 Steven Klepper, Mark Mazur & Daniel Nagin, Expert Intermediaries and Legal
Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 34 J.L. & Econ. 205, 227 (1991).
187 Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Role of Tax Preparers, 22 Pol. Sci. 167, 168
(1989). Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin later formalized these findings, concluding that "strong
support" existed for professional tax return preparers being "on the one hand, guardians
against unequivocal breaches of the legal code and, on the other hand, exploiters of legally
ambiguous features of the tax code to the advantage of the taxpayer." Klepper et al., note
186, at 207.
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preparers (particularly lawyers and CPAs) with a greater amount of
noncompliance generally.' 88
The penalties facing professional tax return preparers support their
tendency to encourage aggressive reporting in response to strategic
uncertainty. Professional tax return preparers are liable for their own
monetary penalties for tax liability understatements, and these penal-
ties self-consciously track taxpayers' accuracy penalties. 189 Profes-
sional tax return preparers are liable for a penalty equal to the greater
of $1,000 or 50% of the income derived by the preparer from a return
with respect to any underpayments on the return, unless the position
was .disclosed and had a reasonable cause or was not disclosed and
had substantial authority. 190 Just as for taxpayers, a higher standard
of conduct applies with tax shelters and reportable transactions, for
which the preparer can avoid the penalty only if it was reasonable to
believe that the position would more likely than not be sustained. 191
Importantly, also just like with taxpayer penalties, no penalty applies
if the understatement on the return had reasonable cause and the
preparer acted in good faith.192
The striking parallels between this monetary penalty regime and the
monetary penalty regime applicable to taxpayers means that profes-
sional tax return preparers have decreased personal incentives to en-
courage taxpayers to report more tax liability in response to strategic
uncertainty. One prominent practitioner noted that "practitioners are
likely . . . to interpret [tax law] . . . ambiguities in favor of the tax-
payer." 93 Survey evidence has confirmed this inclination, indicating
that the vast majority of CPAs and lawyers avow that they will resolve
in favor of their client all questionable items that have a reasonable
basis.194
Moreover, experimental research has revealed that taxpayers often
cede decisional authority about the aggressiveness of tax reporting to
professional tax return preparers. Peggy Hite and Gary McGill found
that only 25% of randomly selected taxpayers had ever been asked by
188 Brian Erard, Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax Practi-
tioners in Tax Compliance, 52 J. Pub. Econ. 163, 194 (1993).
189 For purposes of these penalties, a "tax return preparer" is "any person who prepares
for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, any
return of tax . . . or any claim for refund of tax". IRC § 7701(a)(36)(A).
190 IRC § 6694(a).
191 IRC § 6694(a)(2)(C).
192 IRC § 6694(a)(3). A tax preparer penalty will apply if an understatement is due to a
willful attempt to understate tax liability or a reckless or strategic disregard of rules or
regulations. This is akin to the taxpayer fraud penalties. IRC § 6694(b). Circular 230 also
places requirements on practitioners who provide "covered opinions" to taxpayers. See
Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2010).
193 Gerald W. Padwe, Commentary, in Crisis in Tax Administration, note 5, at 224.
194 Erard, note 188, at 167 (citing IRS survey).
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their professional tax return preparers what position the taxpayer
would like to take with respect to a debatable deduction.195 Signifi-
cantly, the taxpayers in the study only tended to agree slightly that
professional tax return preparers should ask the client regarding
whether to report a questionable item on a tax return. While 45% of
taxpayers agreed that professional tax return preparers should ask
taxpayers about reporting of questionable items, 17% of taxpayers
were undecided and 38% disagreed.196 According to Hite and McGill,
"[t]he implication of these responses is that taxpayers do not want to
make their own tax reporting decisions."197 Recent IRS studies have
reached similar conclusions, finding that 94% of taxpayers who use
professional tax return preparers generally follow their advice.198
As a result, to the extent that professional tax return preparers tend
to exploit uncertainty to report less tax liability, the increased use of
professional tax return preparers could have an important impact on
reporting decisions. Strategic uncertainty may provide the profes-
sional tax return preparers who taxpayers may increasingly employ
more ample ground for exploitation of uncertain tax law. The larger
professional tax return preparer involvement, combined with more
uncertain law, may result in more aggressive tax reporting. This final
reaction is consistent with those sketched earlier in the Article.
Rather than causing more tax liability reporting, tactical factors, in-
cluding potential increased use of professional tax return preparers,
may cause taxpayers to report less tax liability in response to strategic
uncertainty, which may thereby undermine, rather than help, efforts
to raise revenue by reducing tax liability underreporting.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth three reasons why strategic uncertainty
may not raise revenue by reducing aggressive or evasive tax positions.
Instead, this Article counsels that strategic uncertainty may have per-
verse effects on taxpayer compliance and may reduce revenue.
First, strategic uncertainty would often cause taxpayers to perceive
ambiguity regarding tax outcomes. Taxpayers are likely to vary in
their responses to such ambiguity, and these responses may under-
mine the efficacy of strategic uncertainty as a tax compliance tool.
Second, tax penalties decline as uncertainty increases. The decreas-
ing operation of tax penalties as uncertainty increases is deeply rooted
195 Peggy A. Hite & Gary A. McGill, An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for Ag-
gressive Tax Advice, 45 Nat'l Tax J. 389, 398 (1992).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Return Preparer Review, note 183, at 9.
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in the conception of tax penalties and should significantly decrease
taxpayers' incentives to report more tax liability in response to strate-
gic uncertainty. Instead, taxpayers may report less tax liability.
Finally, tactical factors bolster the case against strategic uncertainty
because a combination of tactical factors, including doubts about the
Service's ability to increase its audit rate, negotiation tactics, and the
role of professional tax return preparers, may result in less, rather
than more, aggressive tax positions in response to strategic
uncertainty.
As alluring as strategic uncertainty may be to tax administrators
both besieged with decisions about when to issue guidance and tasked
with improving taxpayer compliance, they should be mindful of the
significant problems with translating strategic uncertainty into higher
tax reporting. Relying on strategic uncertainty as a tax compliance
tool would be misguided, given the realities of the tax compliance
framework.
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